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INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION
INTRODUCTION

Since May 1951, an investigation of the administration of the
internal revenue laws has been conducted by the Committee on Ways
and Means, operating through this subcommittee and under authority
of section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, House Resolu
tion 78, 82d Congress, and House Resolution 91, 83d Congress. The
subcommittee now considers its major objectives to have been sub
stantially achieved and therefore is discontinuing active investigation.
However, against the possibility of a renewed need for congressional
study of revenue administration, the subcommittee proposes to remain
in existence on a standby basis until the end of the 83d Congress.
Meanwhile, this report is presented to review the subcommittee’s
activities and to set forth its recommendations for future action.
Corruption and incompetence at all levels of revenue administration
have been the chief targets of the subcommittee’s investigation. By
drawing attention to the more startling cases in public hearings, the
subcommittee has hoped to alert the Congress and the people to these
twin evils. A resume of these revelations is included in this report to
perpetuate the lessons to be derived from the hearings.
In preparation for the hearings, several hundred alleged instances
of corruption or incompetence have been investigated. Nearly a
thousand interrogations of witnesses in various parts of the country
have been conducted. The record of the public hearings alone runs
to 5375 pages.
These activities have brought to the subcommittee’s attention
numerous weaknesses and defects in revenue administration procedures
and methods. Remedies and preventive measures have suggested
themselves. Some of these have been set forth in the subcom
mittee’s report to the 82d Congress. In certain instances, effective
changes have been adopted by responsible administrative officials
after discussions with representatives of the subcommittee. In the
present report, the subcommittee will comment on the present status
of some of its former proposals and will offer certain further sugges
tions of like nature.
The subcommittee has also sought to contribute to efficient revenue
administration by studying certain broad problems not necessarily
involving the corruption issue. In three areas formal reports have
been prepared and are included as sections of this report. These
concern reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service, the relation
ship between the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue
Service and the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, and the
role of the Treasury in revenue administration.
1

CHAPTER I
SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF MALADMINISTRATION
IN THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM

Tn the past 2 years the subcommittee has conducted an intensive
and extensive investigation of almost every phase of internal revenue
administration. The results of the investigation are reflected in the
tremendous number of changes in personnel and organization which
have taken place in the past 2 years. The significance of these changes
can be best understood if they are related to the hearings which
produced them. Accordingly, this narrative of the subcommittee’s
investigative work is presented.
COLLECTORS OF INTERNAL REVENUE

One of the first tasks to which the subcommittee addressed itself
at the commencement of the investigation was a review of those cases
of employee misconduct which had been investigated in previous
years by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.1 The object of this review
was twofold: (1) To evaluate the methods followed by the Bureau in
investigating and handling such cases, and (2) to ascertain the types
of misconduct with which these employees became involved. It was
established that a disproportionate number of these misconduct cases
involved employees in the collectors’ offices. Accordingly, the sub
committee made a review of the manner of appointment of each of
the 64 collectors of internal revenue and of the conduct in office of a
substantial number of them.
This investigation disclosed that collectors of internal revenue
were appointed on the basis of recommendations made by local
political organizations, often without regard to the character or
ability of the nominee. Moreover, a collector, once appointed, was
ordinarily not subject to control by the Bureau for the reason that
the political strength of the collector often exceeded that of his Wash
ington superiors. This meant that in some offices conditions were
allowed to deteriorate to the point where revenue collections were
endangered rather than offend the local collector. The situation in
the Third Collection District of New York and in the collector’s
office in San Francisco were typical examples. In both these offices
the subcommittee found instances of gross mismanagement or worse,
which had been known to the Bureau for years and which had gone
uncorrected.
During the subcommittee’s investigation, 9 of the 64 collectors
were either removed from office or forced to resign. Of these, 3 were
subsequently indicted on criminal charges and 2 were convicted.
All collectors were forbidden to engage in outside business activities,
and the Bureau began a program of stricter supervision of collectors
1 On July 9,1953, the name of this agency was changed from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the Internal
Revenue Service. Where appropriate the subcommittee has referred to this agency as the “Bureau.”
Other changes in nomenclature are listed in appendix E.
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and their offices. Finally, the administration proposed Reorganiza
tion Plan No. 1 of 1952, making these posts part of the civil-service
system. These changes should prevent a recurrence of the situations
which the subcommittee found in so many collectors’ offices.
The following cases, taken from the record of the subcommittee’s
public hearings, are illustrative of the conditions which the investiga
tion revealed.
James P. Finnegan
Finnegan was a lawyer, and upon becoming collector at St. Louis,
Mo., continued to practice law with the knowledge and approval of
his superiors. His law practice expanded substantially after he became
collector. It was found that he had assisted clients with RFC loan
applications and in lawsuits against the United States. It was also
established that, while collector, Finnegan had referred names of delin
quent taxpayers to an insurance agency which then attempted to sell
insurance to these taxpayers. Finnegan shared in the profits thus
received. He also accepted a gift of furniture from a taxpayer whom
he thereafter allowed to postpone payment of taxes, and similarly
accommodated one other taxpayer who retained him as counsel on a
private matter. Finnegan was also on the payroll of the American
Lithofold Corp. while collector and obtained for Lithofold the services
of a former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Joseph D. Nunan, Jr.,
and a District Supervisor of the Alcohol Tax Unit, James B. E. Olson.
Denis W. Delaney
Delaney was appointed as collector of internal revenue for the dis
trict of Massachusetts in 1944. The record of the hearings discloses
that during 1949 and 1950 Delaney received, through third persons,
$10,000 from delinquent taxpayers in return for which he unlawfully
discharged Federal tax liens on their property. Delaney also accepted
a rent-free summer cottage in return for his services in abating a tax
assessment against a night club in his district, and on at least two
occasions accepted fees from businesses which were conducting nego
tiations with various Federal agencies.
The Delaney case was another illustration of the Bureau’s inability
to control politically appointed collectors. On several occasions prior
to the 1951 investigation, Bureau officials had ascertained that
Delaney had illegally discharged tax liens and had remonstrated with
him concerning this practice to no avail.
Joseph P. Marcelle
Marcelle was made collector of internal revenue at Brooklyn, N. Y.,
in 1944. He was also a lawyer and continued to practice while hold
ing his Federal post; his many other business activities included par
ticipation in the vending-machine business. Marcelle’s income from
these activities was so large that his returns should automatically
have been sent to the revenue agent’s office for audit. Collector
Marcelle kept his returns in his own office, however, and they were
not audited until the subcommittee began its investigation of him in
1951. The resulting audit concluded with the determination of
$32,835 as additional income subject to tax.
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James W. Johnson
James W. Johnson was appointed collector of internal revenue for
the Third District of New York in December 1943. This office had
been one of the most unsatisfactory collector’s offices in the Bureau
for many years, and Johnson proved himself unable to improve
matters. In December 1949, a complete report on the conditions in
the office was submitted to Commissioner of Internal Revenue
George J. Schoeneman, after which Johnson was deprived of all
authority over his employees. For the next year and a half the office
was run by a team of eight specially qualified Bureau officials sent in
from Washington, but Collector Johnson was retained in office and
drew his full pay.
NET WORTH INVESTIGATION OF FIELD AGENTS

In an organization such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue there
are literally thousands of employees who daily make decisions involv
ing large sums of money. Inevitably such a situation creates tempta
tion on the part of dishonest taxpayers, practitioners, and employees,
and the Bureau must therefore be constantly alert to any sign of
corruption. The subcommittee concluded early in its investigation
that a net worth and expenditures check would be of great value in
detecting those employees who had succumbed to temptation. Before
proposing this plan to the Treasury, however, the subcommittee
undertook a net worth and expenditures investigation of a number
of employees in field offices in the New York area. The results of
this investigation were startling. Of those employees questioned,
some refused to submit the required financial data. Others disclosed
impressive accumulations of wealth and living standards far beyond
their means. Acting on this information, the subcommittee then
proposed that a net worth and expenditures questionnaire be sub
mitted to all Bureau employees whose positions were such that they
might be exposed to temptation. The Treasury resisted this program
for a variety of reasons, until after the results of the subcommittee’s
investigation were made known in public hearings. The Treasury
then acceded to the subcommittee’s proposal and in November 1951
distributed net worth and expenditures questionnaires to 30,000
employees. These questionnaires, when used in conjunction with
the financial statements which have for years been requested of all
applicants for employment in the Bureau, will provide an effective
means of detecting unusual increases in net worth and expenditures,
and have already proved valuable to the Inspection Service in the
course of its work.
HANDLING OF CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD CASES IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Tax Division of the Department of Justice reviews all proposed
criminal tax fraud prosecutions before their submission to Federal
grand juries and has authority to reject those cases which it feels are
unsuitable for prosecution for any reason. Under the procedure in
effect prior to 1952, prosecution recommendations were reviewed at
22 different stages in the Bureau and in the Tax Division. A decision
against prosecution at any one of these stages was conclusive. Both
38037—53------ 2
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the Bureau and the Tax Division pursued a policy of granting as
many conferences to taxpayers and their counsel as were desired, and
adhered to various policies which made it easy to decline prosecution.
Among these were the so-called health policy under which a tax
payer would not be subjected to trial if it were found that the strain
of a trial might endanger his life or sanity; and the voluntary dis
closure policy under which a tax evader could avoid prosecution if he
disclosed his evasion before being subjected to investigation by the
Government. The abuses inherent in these old policies and pro
cedures were fully discussed in the subcommittee’s previous report.
The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division at
the time the subcommittee began its investigation was Theron Lamar
Caudle. The subcommittee found that Caudle had accepted ex
pensive fur coats for his wife and daughter from a law firm which
had tax cases before him and which, incidentally, deducted the cost
of the coats as a business expense on its tax return. He also received
a $5,000 commission for his help in arranging the sale of a $30,000
airplane to one Larry Knohl. Knohl allegedly was employed as an
investigator by two New Yorkers, Aaron and Freidus, who had been
indicted for income-tax evasion. After the indictment Aaron had
asserted that he was too ill to stand trial, and the trial judge appointed
a physician to determine his physical condition. The doctor reported
that while Aaron did have a heart condition, he should, nevertheless,
be able to withstand the strain of a trial. Caudle received a copy of
the medical report from Aaron’s counsel, after which his office then
wrote the United States Attorney at New York that prosecution of
Aaron and Freidus would not have been recommended by the Tax
Division if the Division had seen the medical report on the ground
that such a prosecution would have been inconsistent with the
Department’s health policy. The United States attorney declined to
accept the Tax Division’s suggestion, however, and the taxpayers
thereafter pleaded guilty. Caudle and his two assistants all admitted
that the letter to the United States attorney misstated the Depart
ment’s health policy and that Aaron should have been made to stand
trial, but offered no explanation of why the letter was sent. Caudle
insisted however, that the sending of the letter had nothing to do with
his receipt of the $5,000 commission.
Subsequent investigations have further illustrated how the affairs
of the Tax Division were conducted during this period. In October
1949, the Bureau of Internal Revenue recommended criminal prosecu
tion of Garry D. Iozia for tax evasion. Iozia retained a succession of
attorneys, on whose advice he made a number of different attempts to
have his case closed through the use of outside pressure. One such
attempt involved the retention of Washington “public relations”
experts, one of whom has apparently never filed a Federal income tax
return but who had easy access to Caudle’s office. The Iozia case was
subjected to a long series of delays in the Tax Division, during which
time the statute of limitations was allowed to run on 2 of the 3 indi
vidual years involved, and 2 of the 3 corporate years, as well. The
Government’s chief witness, a man in frail health, was compelled to
travel from Florida to New York and was subjected to a searching
interrogation by four Government attorneys in an effort to ascertain
whether his testimony could be shaken. When this proved impossi
ble, Iozia’s attorneys and various witnesses in his behalf were allowed
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to go before the grand jury considering the case (an unprecedented
maneuver) and the Tax Division attorney presenting the matter
advised the grand jury that the Government was not free from doubt
as to Iozia’s guilt. Despite all this, the grand jury returned an indict
ment against Iozia, who has since pleaded guilty and been sentenced
to jail. Iozia had spent some $116,000 in various attempts to avoid
prosecution, and very nearly succeeded.
OLSON, MEALEY, NUNAN, AND TYDINGS INVESTIGATIONS

The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, formerly known as the
Alcohol Tax Unit, is charged with the regulation of the legitimate
alcohol industry in this country and with the duty of stamping out
traffic in non-tax-paid alcohol.
The subcommittee first became concerned with the Unit during
the investigation of James B. E. Olson. Olson was formerly an
official in the collector’s office in Brooklyn, and had been appointed
in 1947 to the post of district supervisor in charge of all Unit activities
in the State of New York and the Territory of Puerto Rico. The
investigation disclosed that Olson had left the collector’s office in
1945 to become associated with a liquor firm headed by one Joseph
Applebaum. Applebaum had had a long history of violation of
Unit regulations, culminating in the revocation of his permit in
1942. After Joseph D. Nunan, Jr., became Commissioner in 1944,
Applebaum applied for a new permit, which was issued at Nunan’s
direction in 1944 over the opposition of Unit field officials. There
after, Olson, who had been Nunan’s assistant in the Brooklyn
collector’s office, joined Applebaum’s firm at an initial salary of
$25,000 a year. He had had no previous experience whatsoever in
this business, and neither he nor Applebaum was able to tell the sub
committee what services he performed for this large salary. Within
a few months after joining the firm, Olson became a partner, although
he was not required to make any capital contribution, and remained a
partner until the dissolution of the firm in January 1947. During this
period Olson had received a total of $94,000 from the Applebaum
firm. He was thereafter appointed district supervisor by Nunan,
although he had had no previous experience in alcohol-tax matters.
After becoming district supervisor, Olson engaged in a variety of
outside business activities with substantial profit to himself. For
example, the American Lithofold Corp. hired Olson and Nunan on
former Collector Finnegan’s recommendation to obtain printing busi
ness. Olson obtained a number of such orders from liquor firms in
his district, receiving commissions therefrom in excess of $6,000.
He also formed the James B. E. Olson Corp., which sold trucks
manufactured by another concern. The Olson corporation sold a
substantial number of trucks to breweries and distilleries in the New
York area. Olson also attempted to obtain a distributorship from
the Tele King Corp., an enterprise controlled by Louis I. Pokrass, at
that time a holder of a Federal liquor permit, but was unsuccessful.
These varied business activities left Olson with little time to devote
to his $9,400 a year Government post.
The subcommittee, in conjunction with the Bureau, conducted an
extensive investigation of Olson’s net worth and expenditures during
the years 1946-50. This investigation established expenditures and
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increases in net worth of $30,000 in excess of Olson’s known income and
resources during this 5-year period. Olson pleaded his privilege
against self-incrimination when asked by the subcommittee to explain
this situation. He was indicted for income-tax evasion on February 3,
1953.
The Olson investigation led the subcommittee to make similar
inquiries into the financial affairs and activities of Nunan and Carroll
E. Mealey, at that time Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in charge of the Alcohol Tax Unit.
Joseph D. Nunan, Jr., served as collector of internal revenue at
Brooklyn, N. Y., from 1941 to 1944, when he was appointed Commis
sioner of Internal Revenue. He served as Commissioner for 3 years,
resigning on June 30, 1947. He thereafter became one of the most
active tax practitioners in the country. His reported net income
from the practice of law exceeded half a million dollars in the period
1946-50. At least one of his clients was a firm to whose tax matters
he had given considerable attention while Commissioner.
While Commissioner, Nunan had adopted a policy of clearing all
appointments of important civil-service posts in the Bureau with
various national and local political groups. As a result, during
Nunan’s tenure there were appointed a number of top officials who
were unqualified for the posts which they held, and whose conduct in
office led to their separation from the Bureau. Among these ap
pointees were Daniel A. Bolich, Carroll E. Mealey, and Olson.
The subcommittee investigation of Nunan disclosed numerous
instances of official favoritism by Nunan to particular taxpayers,
especially in Alcohol Tax Unit matters. The subcommittee investi
gation of Nunan’s net worth and expenditures disclosed that he had
unreported income during 1946-50 of over $161,000. When asked
by the subcommittee to explain this situation, Nunan refused on
constitutional grounds. He has since been indicted on charges of
income-tax evasion.
Carroll E. Mealey had been employed in various capacities by the
State of New York from 1922 to 1943 and was thereafter affiliated
with the National Safety Council until his appointment in 1946 to
the post of Deputy Commissioner by Nunan. Mealey was appointed
to this civil-service post without an examination, on the basis of
recommendations made to Nunan by the New York State political
organization. The subcommittee investigation of Mealey disclosed
numerous instances of favoritism by him toward political or personal
friends. One such friend was Louis I. Pokrass, who had been en
gaged in the liquor business since before repeal. Pokrass’ Federal
liquor permit was revoked by the Unit in 1944 after the completion
of an investigation of alcohol-tax violations by Pokrass. The basis
for the revocation of the permit was that Pokrass had concealed
the criminal records of himself and his associates in connection with
his application for the permit. During the war, when there was an
extensive black market in liquor, the Unit had made another inves
tigation of Pokrass and had received substantial evidence of com
plicity by him in black-market violations. However, Mealey ordered
the Pokrass investigation discontinued in November 1946. On No
vember 21, 1946, a new Federal alcohol permit was issued to Pokrass
at Mealey’s direction, even though three previous applications had
been denied by Unit officials in New York. Four days before the

INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION

9

issuance of the permit, Mrs. Mealey received a nutria fur coat costing
$1,980 from a furrier to whom the Mealeys were introduced by
Pokrass. The coat was paid for in cash. Four months later Pokrass
purchased a new Pontiac automobile at a cost of $1,842.20 and
transferred it to Mealey. It developed that Pokrass was unable to
use his Federal permit because the New York State Liquor Authority
refused Pokrass a State permit, without which he could not do busi
ness. Under Federal law, Pokrass’ permit should have lapsed 2 years
after issuance because of his failure to use it; however, Olson, at
Mealey’s direction, kept the permit in force until after the subcom
mittee’s investigation had disclosed this state of affairs. The sub
committee found numerous other instances of official acts by Mealey
in favor of personal friends.
During the time that Mealey was Deputy Commissioner he con
tinued to maintain his residence in Albany, N. Y., and commuted to
Washington each week, residing here in an expensive hotel. The
subcommittee established expenditures by Mealey during the years
1946-50 in excess of $92,000, although Mealey’s known income and
resources during this period totaled only $51,000. Mealey has refused
to give the subcommittee any explanation of his sources of funds.
The subcommittee found that during the postwar period decisions
on personnel matters at every level in the Unit were made solely
on the basis of political consideration. During this period six dis
trict supervisorships became vacant. Three were filled by men who
had had no previous experience whatsoever in the Unit, and one
was filled by a low-ranking administrative employee. Another was
filled by a well-qualified candidate who was, nevertheless, instructed
by top Bureau officials to obtain political and industry support in
order to obtain the post. The sixth was offered to a man who was
acknowledged to be totally unfit for the post but to whom it had been
promised for political reasons. Similarly, there were many instances
of appointments to lesser posts in the Unit which were made solely
for political reasons. Indeed, the subcommittee has found that the
records of the various candidates for these posts usually contained
summaries of their political support and nothing else. The appoint
ments were then made on the basis of this information. In two cases,
district offices were reclassified and salaries of all officials therein
raised in order to accommodate the desires of local political groups.
The record of Donald S. Tydings is a typical case of Unit per
sonnel practices during this period. Tydings had been appointed to
the Unit in 1933 on the basis of political support and throughout his
career was saved from transfer or dismissal and obtained promotion
after promotion solely because of his political connections. Two in
vestigations made of him during the postwar period resulted in rec
ommendations for disciplinary action, which were ignored because of
Tydings’ connections. In fact, he was promoted following each of
these investigations notwithstanding a great mass of derogatory mate
rial contained in his personnel file.
TREASURY INTERVENTION IN TAX CASES

As a part of its work, the subcommittee undertook to determine
whether top officials of the Treasury Department had intervened
improperly in the decision-making processes of the Bureau of Internal
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Revenue. One of the chief points of contact by the Treasury with the
Bureau is through the Chief Counsel’s office, and the subcommittee
therefore sought access to the “log,” or record of telephone conversa
tions and office visitors maintained for Charles Oliphant when he was
Chief Counsel. This log was finally obtained through the cooperation
of the Department of Justice, but only over the strenuous opposition of
Treasury officials. More recently, the subcommittee has obtained
similar records kept by former Under Secretary of the Treasury
Edward H. Foley, Jr., and by former General Counsel of the Treasury
Thomas J. Lynch.
Based on an analysis of these records, the subcommittee presented
evidence in public hearings concerning six cases in which top Treasury
officials had intervened on behalf of the taxpayer. The Monsanto
and Lasdon cases, summarized below, illustrate the way in which
Treasury officials brought influence to bear to produce questionable
results favorable to the taxpayer in these cases. The revenue loss as
the result of the decisions in these cases was in excess of $10 million.
The determination of the proper relationship between the Treasury
Department and the Bureau of Internal Revenue is most difficult.
The subcommittee’s views on this matter are set forth in chapter IV
of this report. Whatever form that relationship may take, however,
it is indisputably clear that intervention in tax cases by Treasury
officials for political or personal reasons not only produced improper
decisions in tax cases, but also had an adverse effect on the entire
internal revenue system.
William S. Lasdon ruling
The Lasdon family controlled drug patents from which they received
an average of $1,150,000 per year as royalties under a contract with
American Cyanamid Co. In 1945 the Lasdons obtained a ruling that
their interest in the patents was a capital asset for tax purposes.
Subsequently the Lasdons established the Lasdon Foundation, Inc.,
and in September 1947 received a ruling that the foundation was a
charitable corporation exempt from income taxation under I. R. C.
101 (6). Immediately an application was filed for a prospective
ruling that transfer to the foundation of the Lasdons’ rights in sulfa
diazine for a consideration of $6,500,000 or 90 percent of the payments
to be received under the American Cyanamid contract, whichever
was less, would be deemed to be the sale of a capital asset, the gain
therefrom returnable on an installment basis. In March 1948, after
numerous conferences between taxpayers’ representatives and Bureau
officials, the proposed plan was amended to provide for a fixed con
sideration of $6 million payable in 10 equal annual installments.
Despite the efforts in the Lasdons’ behalf of four different law firms
or attorneys, the ruling appeared unobtainable, and application
therefor was withdrawn on June 24, 1948.
Shortly thereafter, endeavors of a less orthodox nature were
initiated by William S. Lasdon. Through another member of the
family, Lasdon met William Solomon, known through hearings of
this subcommittee as an intimate of Henry Grunewald. Solomon
introduced Lasdon to Welburn Mayock, then counsel to the Demo
cratic National Committee. After brief negotiations, Lasdon agreed
to give Mayock $65,000 in cash should he procure the desired ruling.
On July 27, 1948, Mayock began his attempts to secure a ruling
for the Lasdons by bringing the matter to the attention of the Under
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Secretary of the Treasury, Edward H. Foley, Jr. Though Foley’s
duties did not include supervision of the Bureau, he made 4 inquiries
of the Chief Counsel about the case in the next 2 weeks. On August
13, Lasdon’s regular tax attorney, Norman Cann, caused the appli
cation to be reinstated.
On August 16 Mayock tried to see the Under Secretary, and upon
finding that he was on vacation, made an appointment to see Secretary
Snyder the next day. After Mayock’s conferences with the Secretary
on the 17th, the Secretary telephoned the Under Secretary at New
port, R. I., for a report on the Lasdon case, which the latter has told
the subcommittee is the only call of such nature he remembers. The
Under Secretary thereupon called the attorney in the Office of the
Chief Counsel who had charge of the Lasdon case, and instructed him
to report within 2 days whether the Lasdon application would be
approved.
On August 20, Mayock saw the Secretary again and then announced
to Cann that the ruling would come through. On September 22
Mayock pressed the Chief Counsel for an immediate issuance of the
promised letter. The Chief Counsel then saw the Commissioner at
12:15, caused a rapid approval of the letter by the Income Tax Unit,
affixed his own initials, and personally took the letter to the Com
missioner for signature and mailing before the end of the day. On
September 28, Lasdon paid Mayock $65,000 in cash in accordance
with the agreement.
The formal decision to issue the Lasdon ruling was reached at a
Bureau conference on September 17. The Chief Counsel’s memo
randum of that meeting stated:
We are going to go ahead on Lasdon and try to hold the line on the others, if
we can.

Likewise, on September 22, the Chief Counsel reported the issuance
of the ruling to the General Counsel and commented:
I don’t think we can hold the line on the others.

These references were to pending applications of four other taxpayers
for rulings on similar facts. Memoranda of law prepared in the Chief
Counsel’s Office in August had recommended refusal of all five appli
cations on the ground that none was a true sale since it was a transfer
of income-producing property to a substantially penniless charity,
making it evident that payment of the scheduled installments on the
purchase price could be made only out of income produced by the
transferred property. The Chief Counsel was wrong in his predic
tion, since the Treasury found a basis to distinguish the other four
cases and so to deny rulings.
Monsanto Chemical Co. ruling
The excess of proceeds of insurance over the insured’s tax basis in
destroyed property is taxable at capital gains rates. However,
I. R. C. 112 (f) provides relief from such tax when the insurance
proceeds are used to replace the destroyed property.
In a 1947 published ruling issued to Public Service Co. of New
Hampshire, the Bureau decided that the relief afforded by section
112 (f) was not available to a taxpayer who borrowed money to replace
the destroyed property and subsequently used the insurance proceeds
to pay off the loan. In 1950 Congress amended section 112 (f) to
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eliminate the requirement that payment of the insurance precede
replacement of the property, but the change in law applied only to
disasters occurring after 1950.
In January 1948, Monsanto Chemical Co. of St. Louis began discus
sions with the then Secretary of the Treasury and his General Counsel
about the possibility of obtaining a ruling and closing agreement
under section 112 (f) as to insurance proceeds to be received after
reconstruction of a plant recently destroyed by fire. The company
initially suggested that reconstruction might be financed out of the
company’s funds or out of bank loans pending receipt of the proceeds
of insurance on the destroyed plant, but these suggestions too clearly
violated the existing statutory language, regulations, decisions, and
rulings to permit the issuance of the desired ruling. Thereupon, the
General Counsel, the Chief Counsel of the Bureau, and various other
Treasury and Bureau officials began a series of conferences among
themselves and with Monsanto representatives to explore all possi
bilities for giving the company relief under section 112 (f). Considera
tion was given to various alternative methods of financing involving
pledging, trusteeing, or otherwise committing the insurance proceeds
to be received. Thought was even given to amending applicable
regulations.
On March 1, 1948, apparently as a result of these unusual efforts,
a formal application for a ruling and closing agreement under section
112 (f) was submitted, based on a modified plan of financing. Under
this plan, the contractors reconstructing Monsanto’s plant would
agree to wait for payment until Monsanto received the insurance
moneys and meanwhile would finance construction through bank
loans to be guaranteed by Monsanto.
When this application was subjected to normal processing in the
Bureau, recognition that the proposed bank financing depended on
Monsanto’s credit and therefore was tantamount to a borrowing by
Monsanto led the Income Tax Unit and the reviewing attorney in
the Chief Counsel’s office to refuse approval. Issuance of the desired
ruling to Monsanto appeared to them to be impossible without revo
cation of the Public Service Co. of New Hampshire ruling.
On March 23, within a mere 40-minute period, a reversal of this
understandable Bureau attitude was achieved as a result of a new
expression of interest by the Secretary. At 3:40 p. m. the Secretary
asked about the status of the case. At 4 p. m. the Chief Counsel
called a conference of interested Bureau officials and induced the
Income Tax Unit to abandon its opposition to the ruling. At 4:20
p. m. the Chief Counsel advised the General Counsel, “It is all set.”
The closing agreement was sent to the taxpayer the next day.
THE GRUNEWALD INVESTIGATION

Henry W. Grunewald personifies the decay of the Federal tax system
during the period following World War II. Grunewald, formerly an
FBI agent and Alcohol Tax Unit investigator, had, for many years,
been employed as a confidential secretary by a wealthy insurance ex
ecutive. Through this connection Grunewald became acquainted
with many important and influential men in both the public and busi
ness life of this country. He thus obtained access to various sources
of information such as those maintained by banks and insurance com
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panies, and became intimate with officials in most of the Federal
agencies which collect information on individuals.
Following the death of his employer, Grunewald set himself up as
an investigator and public-relations man in Washington, specializing
in the collection of uncomplimentary information on the past life of
his subjects. He was hired, for example, by the United Mine Workers
to investigate the personal life of the late Federal Judge T. Alan
Goldsborough at a time when Goldsborough was deciding a contempt
case against the union. He was also hired by numerous corporations
whose officials were being subjected to lawsuits, and in each case, so
far as the subcommittee has been able to determine, Grunewald
obtained sufficient derogatory information about the plaintiff to
persuade him to discontinue his action against the corporate official.
The date of Grunewald’s entry into the Federal tax field is not clear,
but it is known that he was friendly for years with Daniel A. Bolich
when Bolich was Revenue Agent in Charge at Brooklyn, N. Y., as
well as when he was Special Agent in Charge in New York, and As
sistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue. He also was acquainted
with Commissioner of Internal Revenue Schoeneman, and through
him met Charles Oliphant, then Chief Counsel for the Bureau. The
following cases illustrate the nature of Grunewald’s tax activities:
The Gotham Beef case
The tax returns of the partners of the Gotham Beef Co., a New
York partnership, were audited by the Bureau in 1945. The special
agent on the case recommended criminal prosecution of the partners
for income-tax evasion. While this recommendation was pending in
the New York office of the Intelligence Division, the taxpayers decided
to retain new counsel. Their new counsel, Samuel Schoppick, Irving
Davis, and Max Halperin, were unable to obtain a conference with
Special Agent in Charge Bolich on the case, and it was thereafter
suggested to them that a conference could be arranged through the
intercession of Grunewald. Information available to the subcom
mittee indicates that Grunewald was paid $60,000 in currency by the
taxpayers, in return for which he is said to have arranged a conference
on the case with Bolich. The case was closed in Bolich’s office on a
nonprosecution basis. The taxpayers and their counsel were inter
rogated by the subcommittee in public session and all pleaded their
privilege against self-incrimination rather than answer questions con
cerning the handling of the case and their relationship with Grune
wald. Grunewald himself denied any participation in the case.
The Patullo Modes case
Patullo Modes, Inc., is a New York corporation engaged in the dress
manufacturing business. The returns of the corporation and its offi
cers were audited by the Bureau in 1944, as the result of which crimi
nal prosecution of the corporate officers for tax evasion was proposed
by the special agent on the case. The taxpayers retained an attorney
who discussed the case with Grunewald, whom he had known for some
time. The results of the discussion were inconclusive. Thereafter
the taxpayers retained Halperin, Schoppick, and Davis. Information
available to the subcommittee indicates that the officers of Patullo
Modes, Inc., paid a total of $100,000 in currency to Grunewald for
his assistance in closing the case. The case was ordered closed by
Assistant Commissioner Bolich, under the voluntary disclosure policy,
38937—5 3
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although under the most liberal interpretation of that policy there
could not have been a voluntary disclosure. Bolich attempted to
justify this decision on the ground that he had obtained a promise of
cooperation from the taxpayers. The taxpayers, however, failed to
cooperate, and to this day have not paid the additional taxes assessed
against them. The officers of Patullo Modes and their counsel
appeared before the subcommittee in connection with this matter
and have all pleaded their privilege against self-incrimination rather
than discuss the case or their relations with Grunewald. Grunewald
acknowledges having met with an accountant named Milton Hoffman
and Attorney Halperin in Union Station in Washington and having
received from them a package, which he claimed contained sturgeon.
Halperin stated that he had never brought any fish to Grunewald,
but pleaded his privilege against self-incrimination when asked if he
had ever brought currency to Grunewald.
The Klein case
During the war there was an extensive black market in whisky in
which millions of dollars in currency changed hands. A Baltimore
liquor dealer named Hyman Harvey Klein attempted to circumvent
the OPA price regulations on liquor through a series of complicated
maneuvers involving the creation of a number of foreign corporations,
principally in Cuba. Essentially, his operation consisted of buying
whisky in Canada, invoicing that whisky to his Cuban corporation,
which then resold the whisky to his United States enterprises at a
substantial markup. The purpose of the alleged transfer of the
liquor to the Cuban corporation was to justify the price markup under
United States ceiling price regulations. In fact, however, the whisky
never left the United States, and the transactions with the Cuban
corporation were simply matters of form designed to evade OPA
regulations. The operations of Klein were made part of the extensive
investigation of the black market in whisky which was then being
made by the Alcohol Tax Unit. At the same time, the Intelligence
Division began a tax fraud investigation of Klein, during the course
of which jeopardy assessments in the amount of $7 million were
placed on the assets of Klein and his corporations within the United
States. Bolich was Special Agent in Charge of the Intelligence Divi
sion in New York until September 1, 1948. On August 31, 1948, his
last day as Special Agent in Charge, Bolich ordered the discontinuance
of the Intelligence Unit investigation of Klein, and the following day,
upon becoming Assistant Commissioner, ordered the discontinuance of
the Alcohol Tax Unit investigation.
The problem then remaining in the Klein case was that of freeing
Klein’s assets in this country which were tied up by the jeopardy
assessments. Under the law then in effect, a jeopardy assessment
could be administratively discharged only upon payment of the tax
or the posting of a bond. Grunewald set out to persuade the Bureau
to lift the jeopardy assessment, and Bolich bent every effort to do
likewise. During the next year and a half Grunewald was in con
stant communication with Oliphant concerning the case, acting on
behalf of Klein. Oliphant’s records indicate that Grunewald was
very familiar with the details of the case and was apparently in
communication, not only with Oliphant, but with Klein and his
attorneys as well. The Klein case was never resolved because of
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the inflexible requirement of the statute governing rules of jeopardy
assessments, but Grunewald continued his activities in this direction
until Oliphant and Bolich left office. He has never offered any
explanation of his interest in the case or of his complete familiarity
with all the details thereof.
The Teitelbaum case
In the summer of 1951 the regional counsel in Chicago had trans
ferred to Washington with recommendation for prosecution a criminal
tax-fraud case against Abraham Teitelbaum, a Chicago attorney, and
Paul R. Simon, a business associate. The Bureau by this time had
begun its drive against racketeers and, as part of its drive, had deter
mined that any tax-fraud case against a racketeer would be transmitted
to the Department of Justice with a recommendation for prosecution
if it was felt the Government could make out a prima facie case.
In nonracketeer cases the Bureau continued its policy of sending over
only those cases in which it was felt conviction was assured. The
Teitelbaum case had been initially classified as a racketeer case and
as such would have been sent to the Department of Justice for prose
cution under the lesser standard set forth above. However, after the
file was examined by Penal Division attorneys in Washington, it was
determined that the case was weak in certain particulars and, more
over, that it was not a racketeer case. Accordingly, it was recom
mended the case be sent back to Chicago for further investigation.
At this time Grunewald asked Oliphant whether or not the Teitelbaum
case was to be classed as a racketeer case. Oliphant reviewed the
file and advised Grunewald of its status. He thereafter caused the
case to be reviewed again, concluded that it was a racketeer case, and
accordingly sent it on to the Department of Justice.
Six months later Teitelbaum appeared before the subcommittee
and testified that he had been advised by one Frank Nathan that he
was about to be prosecuted for income-tax fraud unless he paid Nathan
and his associates $500,000 in currency. Teitelbaum stated that the
whole matter had been discussed in a series of telephone calls between
him at his Florida home and various persons in Washington including
Nathan. A subcommittee analysis of the telephone records of the
Washington Hotel established that numerous calls were made from
suites occupied by either Grunewald or his associates to Teitelbaum’s
Miami telephone at the time when Grunewald was discussing the case
with Oliphant. It was after Teitelbaum had refused to pay Nathan
that his tax case was sent over to the Department of Justice. Oliphant
testified that Grunewald had come to him and asked him not to inform
the subcommittee of his interest in the Teitelbaum case. This was
the first knowledge which the subcommittee had had of Grunewald.
Grunewald’s method of operation.
Daniel Bolich was Grunewald’s chief Bureau contact in most of
these tax cases. Bolich originally entered Bureau employ on a politi
cal basis. Subsequent promotions similarly achieved eventually
brought Bolich to the post of Special Agent in Charge in New York
and then to the position of Assistant Commissioner (Operations),
His authority and political background thus made him an appropriate
target for Grunewald’s attentions.
During the hearings, Bolich refused to explain the reason for his
unusual interference in the cases in question. However, some inference
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might be drawn from the net worth investigation conducted by the
Bureau, which revealed his expenditures during the period 1946-50
as at least $115,000, while his known income for the longer period of
1945-50 was only $52,000. Bolich declined to explain the discrepancy.
The records of the Hotel Washington in the District of Columbia
show that he occupied a $20-a-day suite there for a year and a half,
the bill being paid by Grunewald. Bolich also had free use of a new
Chrysler automobile purchased by Grunewald and delivered under
unexplained circumstances to a friend of Bolich. Bolich resigned
from the Bureau after revelation of his role in these cases by the sub
committee, and is now under indictment for income-tax evasion.
Grunewald also bestowed favors on Chief Counsel Oliphant, in
cluding a television set and several air-conditioning units. Oliphant
also received a Chrysler from Grunewald but paid for it after this
subcommittee began its investigations.
Bolich, Oliphant, Commissioner Schoeneman, and other important
revenue administration officials were frequent visitors in Grunewald’s
business suite in the Washington Hotel, as well as in his residences in
Florida, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia. A surprising
list of other Government officials and apparently reputable private
citizens who frequented these Grunewald quarters has been accumu
lated by the subcommittee during its tax investigations. Few of
these visitors have satisfactorily explained the occasion for such
familiarity with a person of Grunewald’s nature and activities.
The subcommittee attempted unsuccessfully to take testimony
from Grunewald, who maintained a complete defiance of the subcom
mittee in a number of public and private sessions, after which he was
cited for contempt by a unanimous vote of the House of Represent
atives. Before his trial on contempt charges, Grunewald requested
the opportunity of appearing before the subcommittee in an attempt
to expiate his contemptuous conduct, and the subcommittee agreed
to hear him after the disposition of his case and before sentence. He
thereafter pleaded guilty to 1 count of the contempt indictment, and
then appeared before the subcommittee on 7 occasions. During
these hearings it was ascertained that after the subcommittee began
an investigation of Grunewald’s activities, Grunewald, in turn,
undertook an investigation of members of the subcommittee and its
staff.
Grunewald refused during his testimony to divulge to the subcom
mittee his sources of income, claiming that most of his money came
from betting on horse races. He claimed that the bets were placed
with a bookmaker whose identity was unknown to him, but through
whose efforts he had been able to amass more than $395,000 in the
course, of 7 years. The subcommittee found, however, a variety of
sources of his income, none of which came from betting. These
included a $60,000 fee (paid in cash) from a wealthy New Yorker for
Grunewald’s alleged assistance in the settlement of an estate tax
matter; a $25,000 fee for Grunewald’s assistance in various matters
pending before the War Assets Administration, then headed by Jess
Larson, a recipient of various favors, including a television set, from
Grunewald. Grunewald also acknowledged having received fees
totaling $10,000 from taxpayers for whom he did nothing other than
introduce them to a tax attorney who subsequently arranged suc
cessful disposition of their cases. Grunewald refused to relate to the
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committee the services which he performed for various individuals
and corporations. Much information about Grunewald’s activities
was obtained by interviewing scores of persons who belonged to the
“Christmas Tie Club.” Members of this club, which included many
high officials in Government and business, received special ties or
other gifts from Grunewald each Christmas.
The fact that a man like Grunewald could enjoy business friend
ships with most of the highest officials in Federal tax administration
is itself an indication of the moral climate in which tax matters were
handled. More importantly, however, the Grunewald investigation
also disclosed serious weaknesses in our Federal tax laws which en
abled Grunewald to frustrate attempts of Bureau agents to audit his
returns. The subcommittee has proposed legislative remedies to
deal with this problem. Grunewald himself is now serving a 90-day
term for contempt of Congress, his incarceration having been ordered
after he had violated parole regulations while under suspended sen
tence.

CHAPTER II
ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN REVENUE
ADMINISTRATION

In its report submitted at the close of the 82d Congress, this sub
committee observed the division of responsibility for the conduct of
tax litigation between the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Department of Justice and suggested the advisability of studying
whether that responsibility is properly divided. That report noted
the dominant influence of the Tax Division of the Department of
Justice over tax litigation policy, the absence of any mechanism for
coordination of policy between the two departments, and the risk
that duplication of effort may be causing waste and delay.
Your subcommittee has now completed an extensive study of or
ganization and procedures in the Office of Chief Counsel of the
Bureau and in the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. De
scriptions of these two organizations and of their functions are set
forth in appendixes A, B, and C of this report.
This study has disclosed duplication of effort between the Office
of Chief Counsel and the Tax Division in every activity in which the
Tax Division engages. The consequent delays both prejudice the
Government’s chances in litigation and impose undue burdens on the
taxpayer. The waste of manpower reduces the number of cases
which the Government can litigate. Effective coordination of tax
policy is not being achieved. Immediate and drastic remedies are
clearly required.
CRIMINAL CASES

Tax fraud prosecutions are proposed by special agents of the
Bureau in the field and are conducted at grand jury, trial, and court
of appeals stages by the local United States attorney. At the present
time, proposals for prosecution are routed through the office of the
local enforcement counsel of the Bureau, where they receive extensive
study, and go from there directly to the Criminal Section of the Tax
Division. In most cases, that Section’s role is limited to giving
approval to the proposed prosecution before reference to the United
States attorney. Conduct of the prosecution by a Criminal Section
attorney, or even on-the-spot assistance to the United States attorney,
is rare.
Early in its activities, this subcommittee gave attention to
inefficiencies in the processing of proposals for criminal tax fraud
prosecution. A resultant major improvement was the reduction in the
multiplicity of reviews through elimination of the routing of such
proposals through the Office of the Chief Counsel. As a consequence,
time consumed by Bureau attorneys in considering prosecution pro
posals has been halved. Moreover, relief of the Enforcement Division
of the Office of the Chief Counsel from the duty of reviewing all
proposed prosecutions has made possible more effective efforts to
19
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coordinate prosecution policies and to study thoroughly every instance
in which a Bureau proposal has not resulted in successful prosecution.
At the time of these changes, serious consideration was given to the
direct referral of prosecution proposals from enforcement counsel to
United States attorneys, thus eliminating processing by the Criminal
Section of the Tax Division. This change was blocked at the time by
the Tax Division.
Under present procedures, the Criminal Section of the Tax Division
does not review proposals for prosecution made by special agents and
disapproved by enforcement counsel. The Section’s existence, there
fore, cannot be justified on the ground that it is providing overall
prosecution policy coordination, since its one-way review at best can
prevent only excessive Bureau harshness to accused tax criminals, and
not undue leniency.
The process of review followed until recently in the Tax Division,
moreover, almost appeared designed to prevent disagreement with the
enforcement counsel’s recommendation. Even now, the Chief of
the Criminal Section may, on his own authority, refer certain cases
directly to the United States attorney for prosecution but may not
reject a case without clearing through the Assistant Attorney General.
Each case is studied first by an attorney in the Criminal Section, then
by the Section Chief. If either recommends rejection, or a policy
question is involved, the case goes next to the first assistant to the
Assistant Attorney General, and finally to the Assistant Attorney
General for final determination. In 1952 the operation of this review
resulted in disapproval by the Criminal Section of only 6 percent of the
cases disposed of after referral by enforcement counsel for prosecution.
Inasmuch as a thorough study of law and facts is given to a proposed
prosecution by the enforcement counsel of the Bureau, it is difficult
to see the utility of this duplicate work in the Criminal Section.
Direct referral of fraud prosecution proposals to United States
attorneys without consideration by the Department of Justice in
Washington would be consistent with present practice in enforcement
of criminal sanctions in areas of interest to other specialized Federal
agencies. Most criminal prosecution proposals originating in the
Veterans’ Administration, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Narcotics,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Food and Drug Administration,
and Interstate Commerce Commission receive no study in the Depart
ment of Justice before reference to the appropriate United States
attorney. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that criminal prosecu
tions proposed by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue are already being directly referred to United
States attorneys.
COMPROMISES OF TAX CASES

Under section 3761 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, authority to
accept an offer in compromise is vested in the Attorney General after
a tax case has been referred to the Department of Justice for litigation.
Present procedure requires that separate recommendations on such
an offer be prepared by the trial attorney handling or supervising the
case in the Trial Section or Appellate Section of the Tax Division, by
the United States attorney in some cases, by the Chief Counsel of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in most cases, and by the Compromise
Section of the Tax Division. The preparation of each of these four
recommendations requires thorough independent study of the offer

INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION

21

and of the case file by an attorney, followed by review by one or more
supervising attorneys in each unit. Ultimate decision on the offer is
made by or for the Attorney General, usually after yet further study
of the four recommendations and case file.
The determination whether, in the course of litigation, to agree to
receipt or retention by the Government of a lesser sum than the
amount of tax originally claimed ordinarily can best be made by the
attorneys and technicians who are familiar with the legal issues and
with the taxpayer’s financial circumstances through association with
the matter during earlier stages of administrative and judicial pro
ceedings. The putative advantage of securing the opinion of experts
on the adequacy of any offer in compromise or settlement is offset by
the expense and delay required to familiarize a new attorney with the
law and facts of the case so late in its history. It is conceded by the
Tax Division that evaluation of offers in compromise is not a task
requiring specialists.
COLLECTION SUITS

Generally speaking, collection suits are technical proceedings to
preserve or improve the Government’s position in a tax case, for
example, to prevent barring by the statute of limitations. Seldom is
there involved any complicated factual or legal problem requiring
expert study; indeed, the taxpayer frequently offers no defense.
Those issues which do arise are not tax matters but priority questions
with which the United States attorney is more familiar than Tax
Division personnel. These suits originate in the field with the Dis
trict Director of Internal Revenue and are conducted by the local
United States attorney in Federal district court. However, they
receive extensive Washington consideration in course of travel between
these two officials. The District Director forwards the proposal for
a collection suit, usually, to the office of the Assistant Commissioner
(Operations). After approval in this office, the matter is reviewed in
the Civil Division of the Office of Chief Counsel. Next it is forwarded
to the Trial Section of the Tax Division and after further study and
clearance is sent to the United States attorney, who carries the case
forward.
The necessity for any Washington review of ordinary collection suit
proposals is not clear. Certainly three independent studies cannot
be justified.
REFUND SUITS

When a taxpayer sues for refund in the Court of Claims, the
Government is represented by an attorney from the Trial Section of
the Tax Division. When the taxpayer brings his action in Federal
district court, the trial attorney likewise is customarily drawn from the
Trial Section, though the Government is nominally, and sometimes
actually, represented by the local United States attorney. In con
trast, attorneys of the Bureau of Internal Revenue conduct all Tax
Court cases.
The choice of forum in a tax dispute is ordinarily a result purely of
the taxpayer’s decision either to resist assessment in a Tax Court
proceeding or to pay the tax and sue for refund in Federal district
court or in the Court of Claims. Accordingly, the same types of legal
and factual tax situations arise in each court.
88937—53------ 4

22

INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION

The Office of Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
required in all refund cases to submit to the Tax Division a lengthy
exposition of the law and facts; this document is known as a defense
letter. The defense letter is prepared by an attorney in the Civil
Division of that office, restudied within that Division by both a
reviewer and the Division head, and in exceptional cases reviewed for
the Chief Counsel by the Assistant Chief Counsel for Litigation.
In defending the suit, the Department of Justice frequently draws on
the Chief Counsel’s office for supplementary information and advice.
A complete new study of law and facts is made by the Tax Division
in all refund suits, thus repeating the work done by Bureau attorneys
in preparation of the defense letter. This wasteful duplication should
be eliminated either by committing the Tax Division to making the
maximum use of the information contained in the defense letter, thus
reducing to a minimum its own basic research, or by eliminating the
preparation of these letters. Even this step, however, would not
completely eliminate the duplication in this area.
Until recently, no work on any refund case was begun in the Depart
ment of Justice until receipt of the defense letter. Inasmuch as
preparation of the defense letter usually takes about 4 months (a
questionably long time), while the Government’s answer is required
under court rules within 60 days, the court’s permission for delay in
answering had to be obtained in every case. In recent weeks new
arrangements have been made for the loan of Bureau files to the
Tax Division on a limited basis to permit preparation of pleadings
before receipt of the defense letter. The subcommittee is pleased to
note this evidence of recognition of the problem by the Bureau and the
Tax Division, but doubts the adequacy of the remedy adopted. The
basic problem of duplication resulting from complete restudy of law
and facts in the Tax Division is not solved. The anticipated advan
tage of eliminating delinquency in pleading may be achieved only at
the expense of delay in the readiness of the Government to proceed to
trial after completion of the pleadings, since the new arrangement
in no way accelerates preparation of the defense letter. Filing of
pleadings before completion of the defense letter reduces the utility
of that document. If trial were begun without the defense letter,
its practical value would be destroyed.
APPEALS OF TAX CASES

The determination to appeal from an adverse decision in a tax case
should be made through a weighing of two considerations, the impact
of the lower court holding on revenue administration, and the chance
of success in the appellate tribunal. One would expect the opinion
of Bureau officials to be controlling in the former area, and that of
the trial and prospective appellate attorneys in the latter. Ultimate
decision should be made by an official fully appreciative of both
aspects of the problem.
Present procedures do not conform to this expected pattern. At
present, the Chief Counsel has a veto over proposals to appeal from
Tax Court decisions, in that such cases must be approved for appeal
by his office before reference to the Tax Division. The Bureau’s
role in determining whether to appeal from an adverse decision in
district court, in the Court of Claims or in a court of appeals, how
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ever, is limited to the supplying of a Chief Counsel’s letter of recom
mendation, which the Department of Justice is free to disregard.
The subcommittee can see no logic in thus allowing the taxpayer’s
choice of trial court to determine the extent of voice allowed the
Chief Counsel in consideration of appeal proposals.
At present, whatever the court in which a civil tax case is tried,
the preparation of briefs and argument in the court of appeals is the
responsibility of the Appellate Section of the Tax Division, though
the Government is nominally, and sometimes actually, represented
by the United States attorney in appeals from district court decisions.
The Solicitor General, however, has authority to determine what tax
cases shall be taken by the Government to the court of appeals as well
as to the Supreme Court. In proposed appeals from the Tax Court,
he has as an aid in this determination the letter of referral by the
Chief Counsel and one or more memoranda expressing the recom
mendation of the Appellate Section. All other proposals for appeal
are accompanied to the Solicitor General’s office by memoranda of
recommendation independently prepared by the attorney who tried
the case below, by the Chief Counsel and by the Appellate Section.
The subcommittee does not question the policy which imposes
responsibility for Supreme Court litigation on the Solicitor General.
No challenge to that policy is seen in the suggestion that the unit
which will actually represent the Government in the court of appeals
might better have final say on proposals to appeal to that tribunal.
The subcommittee understands that this policy is substantially fol
lowed in present practice, in that the recommendation of the Appellate
Section is normally adopted by the Solicitor General, but to the extent
that this is true, reference to that official would seem an empty and
wasteful formality.
LITIGATION PROCEDURES FOLLOWED WITH OTHER AGENCIES

Litigation procedures in cases involving other Federal agencies are
markedly different from those involving the Bureau of Internal Reve
nue. As a general rule, when specialized or technical knowledge is
required in a case nominally within the jurisdiction of a United States
attorney, the interested agency rather than the Washington head
quarters of the Department of Justice supplies the legal expert to
assist or substitute for the United States attorney. Supreme Court
work in such cases is frequently delegated to agency attorneys by the
Solicitor General. In court of appeals proceedings to review orders
of the National Labor Relations Board, Federal rower Commission,
Federal Communications Commission, Securities and Exchange Com
mission, and Federal Trade Commission, the almost invariable practice
is for the Government to be represented by attorneys from the appellee
agency. Certainly for none of these other agencies is there main
tained a special division of the Department of Justice to try civil cases,
approve proposed criminal prosecutions, argue appeals, and accept
offers in compromise.
That the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations, administra
tive interpretations, and judicial decisions thereunder constitute a
complex and specialized body of law will be generally admitted. The
frequency with which United States attorneys call on the Tax Division
for specialists to conduct tax cases, or at least to give major assistance,
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proves the point. The necessity, in conducting tax litigation, to
draw on the Bureau’s experience and to take into consideration its
overall problems of revenue administration is recognized in the pro
cedures discussed in this chapter. These essential involvements of the
Bureau in tax litigation result in duplication of these efforts in the
Tax Division.
CONCLUSION

Tax litigation is only a late chapter in a dispute between Govern
ment and taxpayer in which administrative proceedings in the field
offices of the Bureau provide the early episodes. Tax case holdings,
particularly at appellate levels, frequently determine the course of
administrative disposition of thousands of similar tax disputes. The
stake of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in every tax matter receiv
ing judicial consideration, in the opinion of the subcommittee, neces
sitates the allowance to the Bureau of the greatest possible voice in
the determination of the conduct of the litigation. Existing divisions
of responsibility for tax litigation between the two Cabinet departriients, Treasury and Justice, seem largely accidental. Certainly no
logic can be found in allowing the taxpayer by his choice of trial
court to determine, intentionally or accidentally, which department
shall have control over the litigation. Moreover, the subcommittee
has found an almost complete duplication of effort in all those areas
in which the Chief Counsel’s office and the Tax Division are jointly
engaged.
The subcommittee accordingly recommends that the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Attorney General begin an immediate study of
this problem with a view to ending the present duplication of effort in
these areas:
(1) Legal review of proposed criminal prosecutions;
(2) Legal review of proposed suits to collect delinquent taxes;
(3) Preparation of the Government’s defense in suits for tax
refund;
(4) Deciding whether the Government should appeal a par
ticular tax case, and preparing the Government’s argument in
those cases which are appealed;
(5) Consideration of proposed offers to settle or compromise
tax cases.

CHAPTER III
REORGANIZATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
EVENTS LEADING TO REORGANIZATION

The Bureau of Internal Revenue annually processes some 80
million tax returns and collects more than $65 billion in taxes. In
this operation 55,000 people are employed in more than 1,400 offices
throughout the Nation. The Bureau is thus one of the largest agencies
in the Federal Government, exceeding in size 5 of the 10 Cabinet
departments.
The Bureau is also one of the oldest agencies in the Federal Gov
ernment, having existed in one form or another since 1791. The
“modern” Bureau was created in 1862, and its organization remained
-basically the same until adoption of Reorganization Plan No. 1 in
1952. The numerous reorganizations of the executive branch which
took place in the late 1930’s left the Bureau untouched, and even
after such postwar groups as the Hoover Commission had finished
their work, the basic organization and functions of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue were unchanged.
The Bureau was divided organizationally into several units, most
of which were concerned with a particular type of tax; thus the
Income Tax Unit audited income-tax returns, and the Alcohol Tax
Unit enforced collection of liquor taxes. Each unit had a number of
field offices, and the United States was divided into operational dis
tricts for the separate functions of each unit. No two units had
identical field operating areas. For example, there were 64 collection
districts, 12 technical staff districts, 39 Income Tax Unit districts,
15 Alcohol Tax Unit districts, and 14 Intelligence Unit districts. In
all, some 200 main field offices reported directly to Washington, with
no coordination of field-office activities except through their respective
Unit headquarters in Washington. Almost all decisions, important or
trifling, had to be made in Washington. The performance of every
day functions was so involved with administrative routine and the
necessity for observation of protocol among the various units and field
offices that even the simplest administrative matter took days or even
weeks to accomplish. As the advisory group to the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation observed in its 1948 report, this type
of organization was exposed not only to the hazards of duplication of
authority and effort but also to underdiffusion of responsibility.
In addition to all these organizational difficulties, the Bureau for
years had been staffed at almost every level with political appointees,
The impact of politics on the selection of personnel was most severely
felt in the offices of the collectors of internal revenue. These offices
employed more than half the total number of Bureau employees, and
, prior to the passage of the Ramspeck Act in 1940 even minor posts in
these offices changed hands with each new administration. The
25
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collectors themselves were ordinarily persons of considerable political
strength, and were not amenable to control by the Bureau.
The investigation conducted by the subcommittee in the 82d Con
gress uncovered corrupt practices and exposed dishonest personnel at
all levels of the Bureau. This investigation, moreover, demonstrated
that the Bureau was inefficiently organized and its top officials appar
ently unable either to control the operations of the Bureau or to move
quickly to correct those conditions which the subcommittee’s investifation had found to exist. After the subcommittee’s public hearings
ad been underway for some time, the public demand for reform the
Bureau led to the proposal of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952.
This plan was essentially a combination of various proposals made
by different groups which had studied the organization of the Bureau
during the past 10 years but whose recommendations had gone sub
stantially unheeded. These groups included a Special Committee on
Administration appointed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in 1947, the advisory group to the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, whose report was submitted on January 27, 1948,
the investigative staff of the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives, whose report was submitted in February
of 1948, and a Committee to Direct Management Studies in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, headed by the then Under Secretary of
the Treasury, A. L. M. Wiggins. In 1949 the management engineer
ing firm of Cresap, McCormick & Paget submitted an exhaustive
study of the Bureau’s organization together with its recommendations
for improvements in Bureau management. The authors of the
reorganization plan borrowed ideas from all of these sources.
The three basic changes made in the Bureau pursuant to Reorgan
ization Plan No. 1 of 1952 were: (1) The abandonment of political
appointment of revenue officials, (2) consolidation of field functions
of the Bureau into regional offices, and (3) increased decentralization
of authority to the field. Under this plan, it was proposed to divide
the country into a maximum of 25 regions,1 each headed by a Regional
Commissioner with a large staff. Within each region there was to be
a District Director for each collection district. The District Director
was to take over the field functions of the former internal revenue
agent in charge, special agent in charge, collector of internal revenue,
and district supervisor of the Alcohol Tax Unit. Both the Washing
ton and the field organizations were to be laid out on functional lines
as follows: collection, enforcement, administration, and appellate.
The posts of the two Assistant Commissioners and the Chief Counsel,
which had formerly been filled by Presidential appointment, were
converted to civil-service status, and the offices of collector of internal
revenue and deputy collector abolished. One additional Assistant
Commissioner was created to take charge of the new Inspection Serv
ice. The reorganization plan was approved by the Congress on
March 13, 1952.
Some changes were made before the plan was implemented. The
number of regions was reduced from the 21 originally contemplated
to 17, and the divisional structure was altered by dividing enforcement
work into two categories, intelligence (tax fraud investigations) and
i
The designation of areas and titles of officers has been changed on several occasions during the past
year. For purposes of clarity the current nomenclature of titles of officers and geographical areas will be
used here.
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audit, and by the creation of an additional division to handle the field
responsibilities of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division.
The reorganization of the Bureau was a gigantic task. Regional
boundaries had to be drawn and new offices located. The functions
and responsibilities of literally thousands of key positions had to be
determined and personnel selected to fill them. For example, a
national selection board charged with the responsibility of recom
mending candidates for the 180 posts of regional commissioner,
assistant regional commissioner, and district director, considered the
qualifications of 1,835 candidates, holding personal interviews with
over 650 of them in Bureau offices all over the country.
EVALUATION OF THE REORGANIZATION

The subcommittee has now completed an extensive study of the
reorganization of the Bureau. This study has disclosed that the
Bureau has been transformed into a highly decentralized Federal
agency, organized along functional lines. Its employees, with the
single exception of the Commissioner, are hired and promoted under
the civil-service system. These basic changes in organization and
personnel practices have been recommended for years by a number
of outside groups and individuals, and appear to be sound. In
evitably, some mistakes were made in the initial drafting and imple
mentation of the reorganization plan; many of these have since been
corrected. Other changes will come as experience with the new
system indicates their advisability. Some problems of major im
portance remain to be solved. Overall, however, the subcommittee
has concluded that many of the changes made in organization and
structure of the Federal revenue system during the past 2 years
should result in substantial improvement in revenue administration.
Active study and evaluation of the reorganization plan was com
menced by the subcommittee in late March of this year. During the
course of this study all available Bureau and Treasury files relating
to the reorganization were examined and almost every official who
had had a significant role in preparing the plan or in putting it into
operation was interviewed by the staff.
It has been difficult to obtain much information about the events
leading up to the promulgation of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952.
There are almost no records on the subject either in the Treasury or
in the Bureau. It has been established, however, that the decision to
submit a reorganization plan was made late in December 1951, at a
time when the subcommittee’s activities were a matter of great con
cern to Treasury officials. The plan was evidently drafted in haste.
No one outside the Treasury Department was consulted. Bureau
officials interviewed by the subcommittee staff disclaimed any knowl
edge of the origin or preparation of the plan, stating that the whole
thing was handled in the Treasury.
A comparison of the provisions of the reorganization plan with
various recommendations made in the course of earlier studies demon
strates that the plan was in large part based on such recommendations.
Three previous study groups had recommended a change in the manner
of appointment of collectors and other revenue officials; four advocated
some form of consolidation of field activities.
This subcommittee at the outset of its study directed its attention
to the number of regions most desirable from the standpoint of effi-
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ciency and economy. The 21 regions (chart A) tentatively considered
by the Treasury were patently excessive, and during the period of
installation the regions were reduced in number to 17 (chart B).
If the Regional Commissioners and their staffs were to have per
formed operating functions, little criticism could have been leveled
at the number of regions or their locations. In fact, however, the
Regional Commissioners and their staffs of Assistant Regional Com
missioners, with the exception of the Assistant Regional Commis
sioners Appellate and Alcohol and Tobacco Tax, were expected to
function in a management capacity, coordinating and supervising the
work of the District Directors. In that respect the subcommittee
found the number of regions and of Regional Commissioners, and
the size of the regional staffs excessive and so advised the officials of
the Internal Revenue Service.
Moreover, the coordinating function presupposed a number of
District Directors under the supervision of a Regional Commissioner.
Manifestly, the creation of a Regional Commissioner’s office in
Detroit to supervise and coordinate the work of a single District
Director was inconsistent not only with the stated functions of the
Regional Commissioner but also with fundamental principles of
organizational management.
The large number of regions also left many Assistant Regional
Commissioners with relatively little to do. For example, under the
old system, Intelligence Division field activities were directed by 14
special agents in charge, each of whom was an operating official in
charge of all tax fraud investigations in a large area. The post
reorganization equivalent of the special agent in charge is the Assistant
Regional Commissioner (Intelligence) who is, however, a staff official,
not charged with operational responsibility. Under the reorganiza
tion there were 17 Assistant Regional Commissioners (Intelligence)
and their staffs. Thus, there were 3 more such officials, even though
the Assistant Regional Commissioner had less work and less responsi
bility than had been given to the special agent in charge. The same
situation obtained with respect to the alcohol and tobacco-tax work.
The 15 District Supervisors of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
were succeeded by 17 Assistant Regional Commissioners (Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax). However, the 17 Assistant Regional Commis
sioners did not have operating responsibility for the law-enforcement
work which had formerly been one of the tasks of the district super
visor. Thus, in both intelligence and alcohol-tax work it was neces
sary to create new posts at the District Director’s level to handle
operational responsibilities.
The subcommittee proposed to Internal Revenue Service officials
that the number of regions be reduced. At about the same time, the
new Commissioner of Internal Revenue undertook his own study of
these problems. On July 1, 1953, a reduction of the number of regions
from 17 to 9, and a relocation of some of the Regional Commissioners’
headquarters was announced (chart C). These changes should
bring about a substantial increase in operating efficiency as well as
savings in the cost of tax administration.
The basic framework on which the reorganization is based is the
64 collection districts. The number of these districts and their
boundaries were fixed many years ago and bear little relation to the
realities of present-day revenue administration. For example, there

Chart A

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU Of INTERNAL REVENUE
PROPOSED DISTRICTS
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Chart B
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Chart C
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are 6 collection districts in the State of New York, 4 in Ohio, and 3
in Pennsylvania, but only 2 in California, and 1 in Michigan. The
District Director’s office at Chicago annually processes over 5 million
returns; the office at Reno processes only 145,000. This framework
was, nevertheless, adhered to by the Treasury when Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1952 was proposed, ostensibly because of a fear that
elimination of some of the districts would endanger approval of the
plan. On the basis of its investigation, this subcommittee has coneluded that there is little need for 64 such offices, and recommends;
the elimination of some offices and the relocation of others.
The relationship between the District Director and the Assistant.
Regional Commissioners employs a concept of responsibility and
control which has been difficult to implement. The Division Chiefs,
under the District Director, while administratively responsible to the
District Director, seek technical direction from the Assistant Regional
Commissioner. The subcommittee has found that this dual control
has resulted in confusion among field personnel. In some instances
it was discovered that District Directors were being bypassed by their
Division Chiefs who were reporting for administrative instructions to
the Assistant Regional Commissioners. In many instances, varying
with the degree of completion of the reorganization, field personnel
indicated uncertainty as to whether their responsibility flowed to the
District Directors or the Assistant Regional Commissioners and, in
any event, to whom first. The subcommittee has therefore urged
that the concept of this relationship be reappraised with a view to
clarifying lines of authority and responsibility.
Under the reorganization plan, authority over alcohol and tobacco
tax matters was divided between the District Director and the Assist
ant Regional Commissioner (Alcohol and Tobacco Tax). A Division
Chief under the District Director had charge of the law-enforcement
activities of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, performing roughly
the same functions as the old Investigator in Charge. The permissive
and regulatory functions were given over to the Assistant Regional
Commissioner, who did not have operational control over the Division
Chief in the District Director’s office. Instead, the Assistant Regional
Commissioner was supposed to provide technical advice and assistance
to him through an aide. The subcommittee considered this relation
ship to be cumbersome, and it has since proved to be so.
In many sections of the country there is little alcohol-tax work of a
law-enforcement nature, and the creation of Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax Divisions in all of the District Directors’ offices was unnecessary
and wasteful. Moreover, a regulatory organization such as the Alco
hol and Tobacco Tax Division cannot effectively discharge its police
function unless there is sufficient regional control to enable rapid
deployment of investigative personnel. For these reasons the sub
committee concluded that all alcohol and tobacco tax work should be
done at the regional level. Internal Revenue Service officials,
reached the same conclusion, and orders to that effect were issued by
the Commissioner on July 1, 1953.
The proper location of the intelligence function (investigation of tax
fraud cases), has been a matter of dispute for some time. Many
authorities have advocated centralization of this activity, which is the
function of the Intelligence Division, at the regional level, for substan
tially the same reasons which prompted centralization of the Alcohol.
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and Tobacco Tax Division. It has also been urged that this intelli
gence function be freed from the District Director’s control on the
theory that a more independent Intelligence Division would serve as
a deterrent to corruption. Still others have recommended a lateral
consolidation of Intelligence and Audit Division functions at the
District Director level. This was the view taken by the Treasury
when the reorganization plan was proposed. At the present time,
although the Audit and Intelligence Divisions are separate, their
functions are performed under the general supervision of the District
Director.
The subcommittee, after considering these views, has concluded that
centralization of the Intelligence Division at the regional level would
be preferable. The subcommittee has noted that even now a number
of the operational activities of the Intelligence Division are performed
at the regional level. This fact, coupled with the acknowledged
desirability of centralization which is reflected in the organization of
most Federal investigative units, would seem to bear out the sub
committee’s view. However, Internal Revenue Service officials have
indicated a desire to give the current structure a trial before inaugu
rating any further changes.
This subcommittee studied the manner of selection of personnel for
the posts of Regional Commissioner, Assistant Regional Commissioner,
and District Director. A National Selection Board was to nominate
three candidates for each such post. One of these three was then to
be appointed by the Secretary after consultation with the Commis
sioner. The subcommittee found that while the Board members were
occasionally subjected to extraneous pressures, they appear to have
acquitted themselves well. However, two Regional Commissioners
were appointed by the Secretary without having been processed
through the Board. This regrettable departure from procedure was
ordered by the then Commissioner.
Under the reorganization plan, modifications were also made in the
Washington office. Not only was the number of Assistant Com
missioners increased from 2 to 3 and their functions reapportioned,
but also these Assistant Commissioners’ posts were placed under civil
service.
Other changes have been made in the Washington office during the
past 6 months. The office of Deputy Commissioner was created in
April of this year. This official is the executive officer of the Internal
Revenue Service; the Assistant Commissioners and the Regional Com
missioners are directly responsible to him. The post of Assistant
Commissioner (Administration), has been created and all authority
over budget, personnel, office space, supply and like matters has been
placed therein; the office of Administrative Assistant to the Commis
sioner, created under the plan, has been abolished. Also, the office of
Assistant Commissioner (Planning) has been created, to which have
been transferred the functions of the Assistant to the Commissioner
and other related research and planning responsibilities. The post of
Assistant to the Commissioner has been abolished.
It has long been the practice in the Bureau to postreview, in Wash
ington, the decisions of field agents in individual cases, in order to
assure uniformity and to provide a check against erroneous or im
proper decisions. This was a relatively simple task in the prewar
Bureau. The volume of cases was small, and most such decisions
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were made in Washington. With the vast increase in caseload,
authority to make such decisions was transferred to the field, but
even after World War II every case in which a revenue agent proposed
changes in tax liability was reviewed in Washington. By 1951 the
postreview was expanded to included some cases handled by deputy
collectors, and also a sampling of cases in which the revenue agent,
after examination, had accepted the return as filed.
On July 1, 1953, the transmittal of cases to Washington for post
review was discontinued. It is planned to have this function per
formed instead at the regional level, but procedures for this change
have not yet been worked out. In the meantime, no postreview work
is being performed, except on the initiative of individual Regional
Commissioners.
It may be that the postreview function can be performed as well at
the regional level as it has been in Washington. Internal Revenue
Service officials contend that regional postreview will require less time
and will be more economical than Washington review. It must be
recognized, however, that regional postreview will not be as effective
in insuring uniformity unless this work is closely supervised by
officials from the national office of the Internal Revenue Service.
Moreover, it seems unfortunate that Washington postreview was
abandoned before machinery had been worked out for performance of
this function at the regional level.
Another critical problem is the determination of the degree to
which the interpretative and rule-making function can be decen
tralized. Obviously the need for uniformity in the interpretation of
the tax laws and regulations is as great as the need for uniformity in
decisions on cases. In routine matters these functions can probably
be safely delegated to the field. For example, since 1944 field officers
of the Bureau have had authority to issue over their own signatures
rulings as to qualification of stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, and
annuity plans under section 165 (a) of the Code. Beyond the point
of routine matters, however, the desirability of delegation of authority
to the field is outweighed by the need for assuring uniformity in
interpretations and rulings. For this reason the interpretative and
rulemaking function in nonroutine matters is and must be reserved
to some central group at the national office of the Internal Revenue
Service.
CONCLUSION

The subcommittee considers that achievement of the basic feature
of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952, elimination of political appoint
ment of Bureau officials, was a major accomplishment in revenue
administration. Many of the changes made in Bureau organization
and structure appear to be basically sound. Proper decentralization
of authority to the field should result in better service to taxpayers
at less cost to the Government.

CHAPTER IV
ROLE OF TREASURY IN REVENUE ADMINISTRATION

The Bureau of Internal Revenue is but one of several units com
prising the Department of the Treasury, albeit by far the largest.
The relationship between the Bureau and the Treasury has been a
nebulous one, with the degree of Bureau independence not infrequently
varying with the personalities of the officials of the Bureau and the
Department.
By law, all authority exercised by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or any of his subordinates is derived by delegation from the
Secretary of the Treasury and can be withdrawn by his order. Federal
revenue policy is determined in the Treasury, and Bureau activities
affecting such policy accordingly receive close Treasury supervision.
In the past, at least, the Treasury has also overseen many technical
details of revenue administration, and controlled appointments and
promotions of Bureau personnel as well. This control over the
careers of Bureau officials has been an area of special vulnerability
since it carries with it the risk of improper compliance by those
officials with Treasury wishes in specific tax cases.
From time to time proposals have been advanced for divorcement
of the Bureau from the Treasury. A bill was introduced in the 82d
Congress by a then member of this subcommittee providing for
creation of an independent agency under the bipartisan control of
three commissioners serving staggered 9-year terms. A variation of
this proposal, involving management of the Bureau by one com
missioner, appointed for a term of 10 years and reporting directly to
the President, was advanced during study of Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1952. The proposal that the Bureau should be made an
autonomous agency within the Treasury has also been offered.
These repeated suggestions stem from a recognition of the difference
in functions and essential political consciousness of the Treasury and
Bureau. The former is an instrument for the development and
effectuation of the fiscal policies of the governing political adminis
tration. The latter should provide a quasi-judicial enforcement of
revenue laws, free from any kind of political influence.
The fiscal officers of the political administration must participate
in the formulation of tax legislation, treaties, and regulations. Op
ponents of separation of the Bureau from the Treasury assert that
proper performance of these duties in the fiscal field requires preserva
tion of the Treasury’s power to supervise the administration of the
internal-revenue laws. An examination of this contention would
require a broad study of the development and effectuation of national
fiscal policy, which this subcommittee, of course, did not undertake.
The subcommittee, therefore, expresses no opinion as to the necessity
of preserving Treasury control over revenue administration policies
as an adjunct to its conduct of fiscal affairs, and so makes no recom
mendation on the divorcement proposal. It seems clear, however,
33
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that there is no necessity for Treasury control over decisions on
individual tax cases. This is properly the function of the Bureau.
The subcommittee’s public hearings on six tax cases in which Treas
ury officials intervened are indicative of the abuses which can flow
from Treasury control of the decision-making process in tax cases.
These cases are discussed in chapter I. In each of them the power
of Treasury officials was exerted to bestow a special benefit on the
taxpayer. To terminate the authority of Treasury officials over tax
administration would prevent recurrence of such improprieties.
Five of the six Treasury interference cases involved a tax result
which otherwise would probably not have occurred, and thus deprived
the Government of an aggregate of over $10 million in revenue. In
the Lasdon and Monsanto cases, active meddling by Treasury officials
resulted in the issuance of rulings in apparent conflict with estab
lished precedents. In the Leban and Igleheart cases, equally dubious
rulings were issued by the Bureau after direct expressions of interest
by the then Secretary of the Treasury. A like direct expression of
interest by the Secretary induced the Chief Counsel to short-circuit
normal procedures in approving the taxpayer’s proposal for compro
mise of the Rand litigation. In the Universal Pictures case, the only
apparent result of the Secretary’s intervention was an acceleration of
consideration of the case, but since expediting one case proportion
ately delays all like cases, the absence of other benefit is no reason to
condone Secretarial intervention.
These disclosures of political meddling in revenue administration
and of corrupt practices of revenue officials chosen for political rea
sons have added further impetus to proposals which have been ad
vanced for divorcement of the Bureau from the Treasury. However,
too much must not be read into the six Treasury interference cases.
No redistribution of responsibility over tax administration can guar
antee that the controlling official will be insensitive to personal or
political considerations. A mere expression of interest by the then
Secretary of the Treasury sufficed to produce extraordinary adminis
trative efforts in behalf of the taxpayer in several of the studied
cases. Substituting the Commissioner for the Secretary as final au
thority in revenue matters would still leave the possibility that the
Commissioner might similarly intervene in the interest of a taxpayer.
This result would be particularly likely if, as is quite probable, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue emerged as a strong political
figure as a result of granting autonomy to the Bureau. Moreover,
the subcommittee has found instances indicating that honest and
capable Treasury officials, in the past, have acted as a check on
venality and incompetence in the Bureau.
These six cases arose during a period when Treasury control of
Bureau activities went beyond policy direction and covered minute
details of Bureau operations, and the decision-making process as
well. Even now the Secretary has to approve the designation of an
official in a collector’s office to maintain the petty cash account, the
relief of such person from liability for cash shortages, the designation
of persons authorized to sign checks in a collector’s name, and the
transfer of checking account funds from a deceased collector to his
successor. The Commissioner will probably be authorized in the near
future to handle all such operational details without reference to any
Treasury official. While these changes would be unquestionably desir
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able from the viewpoint of efficiency, they would not attack the prob
lem of Treasury power to influence handling of specific cases in the
interest of a favored taxpayer.
Treasury control over the decision-making process apparently is not
to be released to the same extent. Approval of the Secretary is still
required for any closing agreement based on a prospective transaction.
The power which was abused in the issuance of the Leban and Mon
santo closing agreements accordingly still exists. Likewise, the vague
rule that all requests for rulings involving a policy question shall be
referred to the Treasury still obtains, permitting the kind of interfer
ence witnessed in the Leban, Igleheart, Monsanto, and Lasdon cases.
The subcommittee understands that the Treasury presently intends to
delegate final authority to approve all closing agreements to the Com
missioner but to retain the requirement for consultation on applica
tions for rulings involving policy questions.
If the Treasury needs to retain control of revenue administration
policies because of their significance in fiscal matters, continued refer
ence to the Treasury of rulings involving policy matters may be essen
tial. Certainly the practice of reviewing policy rulings in the Treasury
appears to be inextricably involved in the broader question of control
of revenue policy as an element in effectuation of the fiscal program.
The subcommittee therefore considers it inadvisable at this time to
recommend abandonment of the present system to achieve the more
limited objective of preventing improper interference in behalf of a
taxpayer, particularly if the latter end can be reached by other
means.
Careful study of the four Treasury interference cases involving
rulings suggests that a policy of publication of all policy rulings might
have deterred Treasury officials from intervention in behalf of the
taxpayers. Thus, publication of the Monsanto ruling would have
caused embarrassing protests by the Public Service Co. of New Hamp
shire, to which a ruling had been denied on like facts. Likewise, had
publication of all rulings been standard procedure, the pendency of
four applications by other taxpayers for rulings on substantially
similar facts might have served as a brake on the Treasury officials who
promoted the Lasdon ruling.
A decision to continue Treasury review of policy rulings may resolve
the related question of the subordination of the Chief Counsel of the
Bureau to the General Counsel of the Treasury. Prior to 1934, the
chief law officer of the Bureau reported to the Commissioner. Pro
ponents of separation of the Bureau from the Treasury recommend
restoration of this relationship even in the absence of total divorce
ment. Opponents of separation urge retention of the General Coun
sel’s authority over the Chief Counsel as one means of preserving the
Treasury control over tax policy which to them seems advisable.
The subcommittee has therefore concluded that no change in the Chief
Counsel’s titular subordination to the General Counsel of the Treasury
should be made until the larger question of Treasury control of tax
administration has been resolved. However, the Chief Counsel’s
obligation to obtain the General Counsel’s approval for decisions in
legal matters should be restricted to questions clearly affecting overall
fiscal policy.
Despite the possibility that fiscal considerations may dictate con
tinued control of revenue administration policies by the Treasury and
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thus prevent total separation of the Bureau, the six cases do strongly
suggest the advisability of granting autonomy to the Bureau in
all matters not involving formulation of policy. Corruption, of
course, is possible at any level of Government, but political influence
conceivably would be less strongly felt by career employees of the
Bureau than by politically appointed Treasury officials. If the
Treasury no longer has ultimate control over personnel questions or
like matters personally affecting Bureau employees, Treasury officials
will possess less power to influence what should be impartial adminis
trative decisions in the Bureau.
In practical terms, this recommendation would result in continued
participation by the Treasury in legislative proposals, tax-treaty
negotiations, and issuance of internal-revenue regulations and policy
rulings. With minor exceptions, this withdrawal has been achieved
by recent delegations of authority by the Secretary to the Commis
sioner, and the subcommittee understands that further delegations
to achieve this objective are planned. Since delegations of authority
can be revoked in the discretion of the Secretary, however, preserva
tion of revenue administration from possible political meddling in
the future can more nearly be assured by embodying these changes
in the Internal Revenue Code. The subcommittee therefore recom
mends enactment of code provisions specifically defining the authority
of the Secretary in revenue administration matters, and bestowing
on the Commissioner all other authority. Since the form of such
legislation depends on resolution of the overall fiscal policy question,
no specific legislation has been prepared by the subcommittee at this
time.

CHAPTER V
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
TAXPAYER RECORDS AND INFORMATION

In the opinion of this subcommittee, taxpayers are not at present
required to maintain adequate records or to file sufficient information
concerning taxable transactions. Several provisions of H. R. 7893,
introduced by the then chairman of this subcommittee in the 82d
Congress, were designed to remedy this situation. To some extent,
however, the noted defects may be reduced by stricter Bureau enforce
ment of existing legislation.
The inadequacy of filing requirements is illustrated by the case of
Henry Grunewald, about whom much has been told in chapter I.
During the years when the subcommittee suspects that Grunewald
was receiving major sums for tampering with tax cases, his returns
reflect large earnings from unidentified sources. For example, his
1950 return shows a gross income of $119,361; the attached schedule
explained that $1,580 came from one named corporation, and $117,781
from “brokerage fees and commissions.” When asked what the latter
entry meant, Grunewald testified to the subcommittee that this sum
represented horserace winnings.
The revenue agent who attempts to check the accuracy of such a
return is handicapped by a lack of leads. He can easily verify the
$1,580 item by inquiries directed to the corporation which made
the payment, but where does he seek information about the $117,781,
as to which Grunewald claims to have kept no records indicating the
source?
Moreover, if the revenue agent suspects that Grunewald has under
stated his income, the lack of specification of source hampers his
investigation. If Grunewald had been required in filing his return to
specify the sources from which the $117,781 was derived and the rev
enue agent discovered any item of income derived from a source not
so listed or in excess of the amount attributed to the particular source,
he would have demonstrated understatement. The actual Grune
wald return means that the revenue agent must uncover items aggre
gating more than $117,781 before a case of understatement is made.
Section 54 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers to
maintain such records as the Commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary, may require. Section 54 (b) authorizes the Commissioner
to require any taxpayer upon notice to make a return, render under
oath such statements, or keep such records, as the Commissioner deems
sufficient to show his tax. Section 145, discussed below, provides
penalties for willful failure to file a return or to keep records required
by law and for the filing of a fraudulent return. Regulations 111,
section 29.54-1, gives the Commissioner authority to prescribe the
form of income-tax returns.
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The subcommittee does not understand why this authority is not
sufficient for the Commissioner to require taxpayers like Grunewald
to give fuller information as to sources of income on their returns, to
maintain records permitting verification of such sources and amounts
of income, and to supply such supplemental information as may be
required.
INFORMATION RETURNS

The subcommittee’s investigations indicate a lax enforcement of
information return requirements, and an even less excusable failure
to make proper use of such information returns as are received. A
revamping of the entire information return program is in order.
Section 147 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code requires any person
making payment to another person of rent, compensation, or other
income of more than $600 in any year to file an information return.
Sections 147 (b), 148, and 149 permit the Commissioner to require
filing of information returns as to stock brokerage transactions, and
payments of interest and dividends in any amount.
The subcommittee is unaware of any genuine effort to enforce the
requirement of the filing of information returns as to isolated but
significant transactions. Such were the payments received by Henry
Grunewald, whether derived from horserace betting or services to
distressed taxpayers. Had information returns been received, Grunewald’s lumping most of his income under one vague heading would
have presented less of an obstacle to the investigating revenue agent.
The subcommittee is convinced that the Bureau has failed to give,
adequate publicity to the requirements of section 147 (a). The public
in general seems unaware of the obligation to file an information return
upon payment of more than $600 a year to a doctor, lawyer, domestic
servant, or private landlord. Immediate efforts to remedy this
situation seem appropriate.
A particular effort to punish failure to file information returns as to
substantial cash payments is advocated. The absence of documentary
evidence of such transactions makes their detection substantially
impossible. In the subcommittee’s experience, payment of large
cash sums is usually indicative of a conspiracy to evade taxation.
Strict enforcement of information return requirements would cause
many payors in such circumstances to hesitate to further the fraudu
lent purpose of the payee, whereas under present lax policies the payor
stands in no real jeopardy.
A second well-recognized tax-evasion device is the partial com
pensation for services through the making of what purport to be gifts
of goods or services. Such payments of compensation in kind are
clearly taxable income but too infrequently appear on tax returns.
As an aid to detection of such evasion, the subcommittee proposed in
H. R. 7893 to add to section 147 of the Internal Revenue Code a
requirement for the filing of information returns by anyone making
payments in kind worth more than a specified sum in any year to any
officer, employee, partner, or shareholder of such person. A proposal
of this nature is still favored by the subcommittee.
Complaints have been received that information returns are fre
quently not associated with the tax return before audit. Such
inefficiency not only handicaps the revenue agent performing the
audit, but also imposes an undue burden upon the taxpayer to
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produce records substantiating return entries which he had a right
to assume would be verified from information returns.
The subcommittee understands that the magnitude of the job of
processing all information returns actually received has led the
Bureau to adopt a policy of utilizing only limited percentages of
certain classes of returns. Requiring employers, banks, stock corpo
rations, and brokers to file information returns imposes upon them
some of the expense and burden of the Government’s task of checking
on the. honesty and accuracy of tax-return filings. The subcommittee
urges the Bureau to avoid whenever possible demands for informa
tion returns which it knows in advance are not going to be utilized.
CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD SENTENCES

The basic purpose of criminal penalties is the deterrent effect upon
potential violators. This effect is achieved only when these sanctions
are imposed promptly and with certainty upon those who transgress.
This is not always the case with tax violations. Courts appear
reluctant to impose the full penalties set out in section 145 of the
Internal Revenue Code and elsewhere. In many cases, only money
fines are imposed. Prison sentences tend to be quite short and fre
quently are suspended. There is a noticeable lack of uniformity in
the manner in which penalties are imposed for similar offenses in
various judicial districts.
The reliance upon fines is inadvisable. A money penalty for a
money offense permits the potential violator to weigh possible gain
against risk of loss. The present statutory maximum fine of $10,000
doubtless appears small to high-bracket evaders. For such offenders,
the 50-percent fraud penalty applied as a civil sanction is the real
financial deterrent, and no punishment for the crime of tax evasion
will be felt unless imprisonment is ordered.
One reason for the present dubious leniency is a popular feeling,
shared by some courts, that tax evasion is a minor offense. Actually,
every successful tax evasion imposes an additional tax burden on the
millions of honest taxpayers. Tax evasion is thus a crime affecting
all citizens. With the national security depending on the Govern
ment’s ability to finance adequate defense measures, every taxpayer
must shoulder his share of the burden. Willful failure to do so in
these times is an offense of serious proportions and should be so
regarded when sentences are imposed.
ENFORCEMENT

Section 145 of the Internal Revenue Code sets out the penalties
which shall attach to willful violations of tax law. Subsection (a)
thereof makes willful failure to file required returns or other informa
tion or to pay the tax a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of
1 year of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The period of statutory
limitation is 3 years. Subsection (b) makes any willful attempt to
defeat or evade the payment of taxes a felony with a maximum prison
term of 5 years and $10,000 in fines. The statutory period is 6 years.
The distinction between the offenses contemplated in the two sub
sections is not clear. Currently the courts require evidence of a
definite affirmative action, intended to defeat or evade the tax laws,
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to qualify as a felony, holding that a mere passive failure to comply
with the requirements of the law is covered only by subsection (a).
This interpretation results in the punishment of willful nonfiling asa misdemeanor, while willful falsification of a tax return is accorded
more severe treatment as a felony.
Your Subcommittee has difficulty discerning sufficient distinction
between the two crimes to support the more lenient treatment
accorded willful failure to file. The degree of blame to be attached
to either offense appears equal, the ultimate purpose in both cases
being to avoid the payment of proper taxes. The Supreme Court
opinion which provided the precedent for the current judicial position
voices the same inability to recognize the logic of the distinction.
Moreover, the short statutory limitation placed upon the passive
offense is inadequate. The Government is faced with a greater
enforcement problem in a case of nonfiling than in a fraud case, since
in the latter the Bureau of Internal Revenue is placed upon notice of
a possible violation by the very fact of the filing.
The subcommittee therefore recommends that legislative action
be taken equalizing the two offenses, or at least extending the period
of limitations for willful failure to file a return. A provision of
H. R. 7893 was designed to achieve the latter.
PUBLICATION OF RULINGS

In its report to the 82d Congress, this subcommittee praised adop
tion by the Bureau of a new policy of publishing in permanent form
all decisions and rulings involving points of law upon which the
Bureau would thereafter rely as precedents. This policy has now
been implemented by detailed instructions which, if properly applied,
will result in publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin of all
rulings of general interest issued to taxpayers and their representatives
as well as to field officers of the Bureau.
The subcommittee’s advocacy of broad publication of rulings stems
from the recognition of the deterrent effect of such a policy on possible
favoritism to particular taxpayers. As stated in chapter IV, the
subcommittee believes that the discriminatory rulings in the Lasdon
and Monsanto matters would never have been issued had the respon
sible Treasury officials known that publication would follow, per
mitting protests by other taxpayers denied rulings on similar facts.
A second benefit of broad publication is the dissemination of tax
knowledge among both practitioners and Bureau agents. Knowledge
of the Bureau’s position on a particular question will enable tax
counselors so to guide their clients’ affairs as to avoid unnecessary
disputes, to the advantage of both the taxpayers and the Government.
Moreover, preservation of all rulings of general interest in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin should promote uniformity in administrative deci
sions by field agents, which the recent decentralization of Bureau
activities has made a larger problem than heretofore.
The new instructions contain exceptions which excuse publication
of rulings involving no legal question of interest to anyone other
than the immediately affected taxpayer. Two of these exceptions
could lend themselves to abuse. One exempts rulings dealing with
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secret formulas or business practices; the other, rulings “which in the
interest of a wise administration of the Revenue Service should not
be published.” To prevent frustration of the twin purposes of the
publication policy, the subcommittee cautions against overfrequent
application of these two exceptions.
The new instructions contemplate publication of many rulings in
digest form. In some instances, the facts of the ruling application
may be omitted altogether; in others, the language of the ruling may
be substantially altered. To the extent that the objective is the
avoidance of unnecessary printing expense, digesting may be a
meritorious modification of a strict publication policy. The achieve
ment of the objectives of the policy, however, requires an unvaried
accuracy and honesty in the preparation of such digests. Frequently
a full statement of the facts is essential to the understanding of a
ruling.
The Bureau’s instructions governing publication of taxpayer rulings
became effective on October 12, 1953. The subcommittee, accord
ingly, has had no opportunity to study the new program in actual
operation.
COHAN RULE_

In the case of Cohan v. Commissioner (39 F. 2d 540 (1930)), the
taxpayer was engaged in an activity clearly involving deductible
expenses but failed to keep any records thereof. The Bureau disal
lowed taxpayer’s estimated expense deductions for lack of substanti
ation. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a
reasonable deduction must be allowed, though doubts could be
resolved against the taxpayer since they resulted from his omission
to keep adequate records.
The subcommittee believes that the Cohan rule allows the indifferent
taxpayer to shirk the burden of assisting the Government in determi
nation of his tax liability by keeping reasonable records of his deducti
ble expenses. In H. R. 7893, the subcommittee accordingly proposed
amendment of section 23 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code by adding
a prohibition of allowance of deductions unless substantiated in a
manner reasonable under the circumstances. The subcommittee again
urges adoption of such a provision.
The subcommittee is not proposing a strict rule to determine the
type and amount of substantiation for claimed deductions. Receipts
should be required to evidence an expenditure where prepared in
normal course of business, as in the case of hotel bills, but should not
otherwise be demanded, as in the case of taxi fares. A contempo
raneous record of expenses of the latter type should ordinarily suffice.
Where a particular transaction is generally substantiated, normal
related expenses may often be allowed without requiring further
substantiation. For example, where the taxpayer satisfactorily
establishes the fact of a business trip by producing airline tickets and
hotel bills, deductions for reasonable expenses for taxi fares, tips, and
meals might also be approved without further evidence. Taxpayers
should also keep records which would enable an examining officer to
determine whether or not expenditures are directly connected with
taxpayer’s business activities.
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COLLECTION OF DELINQUENT TAXES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

At the present time a large number of officials and employees of
the Federal Government and its instrumentalities are delinquent in
their tax payments. Since these employees have practically no
property, these payments can be collected only from the income
received from their Federal employment. The courts, however, have
decided that in the absence of specific legislation, the Federal Gov
ernment cannot reach a Federal employee’s salary to satisfy his
indebtedness to the Government. Ordinary taxpayers, in contrast,
are subject to garnishment of their salaries under section 3670 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
To remedy this situation, a provision of H. R. 7893 gave the
Bureau power to garnishee wages of such delinquent Federal em
ployees by notice to the employing agency. Amounts to be deducted
from salary to satisfy unpaid tax assessments were limited to 10
percent of the first $10,000 in any year, and 25 percent of the excess.
The subcommittee reaffirms its advocacy of this provision.
ASSISTING IN PREPARING RETURNS

Many taxpayers, confused by the intricacies of tax Jaw, obtain the
assistance of others in the preparation of their Federal tax returns.
Low-income taxpayers in particular are prey to unqualified persons
temporarily posing as tax consultants during the period just prior to
March 15. Under the Internal Revenue Code there is no obligation
on the part of any such assistant to acknowledge his responsibility
for the return by signing it in the space provided.
The subcommittee has discovered instances where these unscrupu
lous persons were falsifying returns. The Bureau of Internal Revenue,
though well aware of the problem, is handicapped by lack of ready
proof of the authorship of such small-scale tax frauds. Therefore,
your subcommittee recommends that the Internal Revenue Code be
amended to provide that any person who for compensation assists in
preparing any Federal tax return for another be required, under
appropriate penalty, to state his name and address on such return.
A provision to such effect was included in H. R. 7893.
PLEADING OF PRIVILEGE BY PRACTITIONERS

The opportunity to represent taxpayers before the Treasury is a
privilege accorded to attorneys and accountants meeting prescribed
standards of character and fitness. In its last report, this subcom
mittee devoted attention to the inadequacies of the system of enrolling
practitioners and of disciplining those whose conduct in Treasury
matters fell below proper standards of professional ethics. As a
result, the Treasury practitioner program has been completely
revamped.
The subcommittee has several times encountered Treasury prac
titioners who, as witnesses in subcommittee hearings, pleaded privilege
under the fifth amendment when asked about their roles in conduct
of tax cases. Certain of these witnesses refused on constitutional
grounds to answer the question whether they had ever bribed a
Federal officer. The subcommittee does not believe that a person
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who cannot answer such a question with an unequivocal negative is
entitled to continue to enjoy the privilege of practice before the
Treasury.
CHIEF COUNSEL’S OFFICE

Review Division and Joint Committee.—The Internal Revenue Code
requires that all proposed credits to a single taxpayer which total more
than $200,000 must be reviewed by the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation of the Congress. The Review Division of the
Office of Chief Counsel occupies itself almost exclusively with a review
of these $200,000 refund cases before they are submitted to the Joint
Committee. This identity of function suggests that the primary pur
pose of the Review Division is to protect the Bureau of Internal
Revenue from criticism by eliminating the questionable cases from
among those which must, by law, be examined by the Joint Committee.
The subcommittee believes that the efforts of the Review Division
might better be directed toward a general review, on a spot-check
basis, of all refund transactions, independent of sums involved. The
recent delegation to District Directors of Internal Revenue of au
thority to make refunds up to $200,000 makes such sampling post
review particularly desirable.
Appeals Division.—Within the Appeals Division of the Office of
Chief Counsel, there is a Court of Appeals Section, the primary func
tion of which is the preparation of petitions and record on appeal from
Tax Court decisions. In order to perform this function, the Court
of Appeals Section attorney must first study the facts and record of
the case. This time-consuming task represents an unnecessary dupli
cation of effort. The trial attorney is already thoroughly acquainted
with the case, while the attorney who is to handle the case on appeal
must ultimately become familiar with the record. Either would be
competent to prepare the petition and record on appeal. There
appears to be no reason why these tasks should be performed by a
third attorney who is unfamiliar with the case.
Preparation of the petition and record by the appellate attorney
would assure inclusion of the elements he considers vital to his argu
ment. On the other hand, performance of these duties by the trial
attorney might be faster. The subcommittee expresses no prefer
ence between these considerations, but has concluded that the prac
tice of having this work done by the Court of Appeals Section is
wasteful. The subcommittee therefore recommends that the Court
of Appeals Section be abolished.
AGENT PRODUCTION RECORDS

The Bureau maintains rather elaborate records of the additional
revenue resulting from the efforts of individual revenue agents, special
agents, and deputy collectors. Until recently, consideration was
given to these records in the evaluation of employees for advancement.
This practice still prevails in promoting revenue agents.
At best, the extra revenue gathered by an employee is a poor meas
ure of his ability since so strongly affected by the type of case to
which he happens to be assigned. Worse, an ambitious employee
may be tempted to undue severity toward taxpayers to better his
production record. The subcommittee, therefore, advises the dis
continuance of the use of these records in promotion decisions.

APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
CHIEF COUNSEL

Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952 provides for the appointment
by the Secretary of the Treasury of an Assistant General Counsel of
the Treasury who will be under the classified civil service and who
will be responsible for legal matters within the Internal Revenue
Service. Although the primary function of this Assistant General
Counsel is to provide legal advice and service to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, the line of authority flows from him to the
General Counsel of the Treasury, to whom he is directly responsible.
The Assistant General Counsel is more commonly referred to as the
Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service and he and his staff
are physically located in the Internal Revenue Building.
ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL

Under the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service there are
five Assistants Chief Counsel. One of these devotes himself primarily
to housekeeping tasks such as personnel, supply, etc., and is known
as the Assistant Chief Counsel (Administration). The other 4 have
operating responsibilities, each exercising supervision over 2 of the
8 divisions in the national office where the legal work of the Service
is performed. Each Assistant Chief Counsel also supervises corre
sponding elements of the Regional Counsel’s offices. They are known
respectively as the Assistant Chief Counsel for Claims, Enforcement,
Litigation, and Technical.
There are, in addition, five special assistants to the Chief Counsel
who operate in the capacity of special aides to the Chief Counsel.
Usually, each of these is assigned to one of the Assistants Chief
Counsel, serving as liaison between him and the Chief Counsel and
taking on special tasks as assigned.
OPERATING DIVISIONS

There are within the Office of Chief Counsel eight divisions which
perform, on an operating and/or supervisory level, the legal tasks for
which the Office of Chief Counsel is responsible.
(a) The Appeals Division
The Appeals Division is concerned solely with the processing, trial,
and argument of cases before the Tax Court of the United States.
The Tax Court hears petitions by taxpayers who are protesting the
validity of proposed assessments against them. Matters may be
brought before the Tax Court only by the taxpayer, who is given 90
45
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days following issuance of a deficiency notice to take such action
before assessment is made. Once the assessment is made, the tax
payer no longer has access to the Tax Court and must take his case
to the Federal district court or to the Court of Claims after payment
of the tax assessed.
Most of the actual work of preparing a case for hearing before the
Tax Court and the argument of the case itself is performed in the
field by the appellate counsel, located in the offices of the several
regional counsel (see below). The Appeals Division in the Washing
ton office performs primarily a supervisory function with respect to
the operations of appellate counsel in Tax Court matters, and for
this purpose is divided into three sections:
(1) The Brief Review Section examines all briefs and other
legal papers prepared in the field for filing with the Tax Court,
checking them for adequacy, accuracy, and conformity with
overall national policy. Action on decision memoranda pre
pared in the field when the Government has lost a Tax Court
case are examined initially by the attorney who reviewed the
case briefs, if he is available.
(2) The Court of Appeals Section does the necessary prepara
tory work when a Tax Court case is up for appeal before one of
the United States courts of appeals. This entails the preparation
of the record on appeal, preparation and filing of the petition
for appeal if the Government is to be the appellant, and handling
for the Internal Revenue Service all subsequent questions of
compromise, certiorari, etc.
(3) The Section 722 Section is concerned with the handling
of cases to be heard by the Tax Court which involve the excess
profits tax relief provisions of section 722 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The section attorneys may advise the appellate counsel
in the handling of a given case or may take over the case entirely
under certain circumstances.
(6) The Civil Division
The Civil Division cooperates with and assists the Tax Division of
the Department of Justice in handling civil tax litigation. It deter
mines the legal position of the Internal Revenue Service in these cases.
The bulk of its work consists of—
(1) Suits for refund. These comprise about 75 percent of the
work of the Civil Division. Suits for refund are brought by tax
payers against the Government for the purpose of recovering tax
payments which are alleged to have been erroneously made and
retained. As soon as the suit is filed, the Tax Division assumes
jurisdiction over the case, the Civil Division cooperating by pre
paring a “defense letter” for the use of the Tax Division, stating
the law and facts in the case. The Civil Division also handles
any subsequent servicing of the case, such as recommendations on
compromise offers and appeals.
(2) Collection suits filed by the Government against the tax
payer for the purpose of effecting or aiding collection of delinquent
tax assessments. Frequently, the purpose of such suits is to
obtain a judgment extending the 6-year statute of limitations for
collection of an assessed tax or to protect the interest of the
Government against third parties. The function of the Civil
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Division with regard to the collection suit is to pass upon its
legal acceptability and feasibility before referring it to the Tax
Division for further consideration.
(c) The Claims Division
This Division handles all legal work in such matters as proceedings
under the Bankruptcy Act, receiverships or insolvencies, assignments
for the benefit of creditors, corporate reorganizations, decedents’
estates, applications for discharge of property from Federal tax liens,
and foreclosure suits, arising as a result of tax claims against one of
the parties involved therein. Wherever such a situation arises, the
office of the local district director of internal revenue will forward the
matter to the Claims Division for consideration of the appropriate legal
steps to be taken. Where necessary, the Claims Division will refer the
matter to the Tax Division of the Department of Justice with a request
that specific legal action be initiated. The Head of the Claims
Division has also been delegated the responsibility for performing the
legal review of and preparing a legal opinion on offers in compromise
as required of the General Counsel under section 3761 (b) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
(d) The Enforcement Division
The Enforcement Division is charged with supervisory responsi
bility over the legal screening of all proposed criminal prosecutions
for tax evasion and is the Office of Chief Counsel’s counterpart of the
Criminal Section of the Tax Division. Field attorneys in the office
of the regional counsel, known as enforcement counsel (see below),
pass upon the legal adequacy of proposed fraud cases and refer to the
Criminal Section of the Tax Division those in which prosecution is
approved; the transmittal letter undertakes, to a degree dependent
upon the complexity of the individual case, a legal analysis of the
facts, law, and evidence in the case. The Enforcement Division staff
in Washington maintains administrative and technical control of the
enforcement operation and conducts a program of postaudit of cases
to insure uniformity and adherence to policy. Most negotiations with
the Tax Division, e. g., where prosecution has been declined by the
latter and a protest is under consideration, are conducted at the
national level.
(e) Interpretative Division
This Division is concerned with the task of interpreting and apply
ing to given fact situations the statutes, regulations, and decisions
which comprise the Federal tax law. Requests for interpretations
come from two sources: employees of the Internal Revenue Service,
and the taxpaying public. Employees may request legal advice on
oases before them for decision; such requests are handled by the
Interpretative Division. Inquiries from taxpayers usually take the
form of a request for a ruling on the tax consequences of a transaction,
proposed or consummated. For example, a taxpayer’s decision
whether to enter into such a transaction often hinges on the tax
consequences thereof. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue may,
upon request, advise the taxpayer as to his views thereon. Requests
for such rulings are initially considered by the Technical Ruling
Division in the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical), and
most rulings are issued by him. Where the request presents a complex
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fact situation or the legal issue involved is unclear or of great impor
tance, the proposed ruling is forwarded to the Interpretative Division
for review. Some requests for rulings are accompanied by a request
for a closing agreement, which is a binding agreement between the
taxpayer and the Commissioner as to the tax consequences of a trans
action. All proposed closing agreements are reviewed by the Inter
pretative Division.
(/) Legislation and Regulations Division
This Division is charged with the processing of all proposed new
legislation, regulations, and Treasury decisions, with proposed amend
ments to existing legislation and regulations; and with all other work
related thereto. The staff of this organization prepares drafts of
proposed legislation and regulations, in conjunction with the Office
of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) the legal and technical
experts of the Treasury Department, and congressional committees.
The Division also prepares and reviews memoranda forming the basis
for reports to congressional committees on pending bills relating to
internal revenue matters, and coordinates the Service’s position on
questions involving the construction of existing statutes or regulations.
(g) The Review Division
The primary function of the Review Division is to examine any
case, involving certain types of taxes, in which a refund or a credit to
a taxpayer amounting to more than $200,000 has been proposed.
This review is preparatory to the examination that will be made of
each such proposed refund or credit by the Joint Committee on In
ternal Revenue Taxation. Section 3777 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code requires that a report be submitted to the joint committee
covering such a proposed credit, and the Review Division is responsible
for the preparation of this report to the committee.
(h) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
This Division concerns itself with all of the legal work of the Internal
Revenue Service pertaining to alcohol, tobacco, and certain firearms
taxes. It performs, in this specific area, all of the combined functions
performed by the above-listed Divisions in respect to other tax mat
ters, including interpretation of laws, study and preparation of legis
lation, defense letters, and criminal cases. It also maintains technical
supervision over the attorneys in charge (alcohol and tobacco tax) in
the offices of the regional counsel.
FIELD STAFF

The Chief Counsel is represented in the field by 9 regional counsel,
located in each of the regional administrative areas of the Internal
Revenue Service. The regional counsel is the principal legal repre
sentative of the Chief Counsel in the field and acts as legal adviser
to the regional commissioner. He is assisted by a staff, the organi
zation and duties of which correspond somewhat to those of the
Washington office of the Chief Counsel.
The appellate counsel and his staff handle all cases before the Tax
Court in the regional area and provide legal advice to the assistant
regional commissioner (appellate). The appellate counsel reports to
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the regional counsel but is controlled in technical matters by the
Appeals Division in Washington.
The enforcement counsel is similarly the field representative of the
Enforcement Division in Washington. It is the enforcement counsel
who performs the on-the-line task of screening fraud cases recom
mended for criminal prosecution by the regional staff of the Intelli
gence Division, the Washington Enforcement Division staff per
forming primarily a supervisory and administrative function. The
enforcement counsel advises the assistant regional commissioner
(intelligence) on legal issues.
The attorney in charge (alcohol and tobacco tax) supplies all the
necessary legal services at the regional level in connection with the
local operation of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division.
The civil advisory counsel is the newest member of the regional
counsel’s staff. His function is to advise the regional commissioner
on all legal problems of a civil nature which are not specifically
within the purview of one of the other members of the regional
counsel’s staff.
In some of the regional areas, the entire legal staff is located at the
regional headquarters. In other instances, usually in the regions
covering a large geographical area, there are branch installations
located at one or more of the district subdivisions of the region.
The branches all report to, and operate under the supervision of, the
regional counsel. They vary in makeup, some having representation
from all four of the staff divisions of the regional counsel’s office
described above, while in others one or more may be omitted, depend
ing on the workload in the area.

APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION OF THE TAX DIVISION OF THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT

The principal organizational breakdown within the Department of
Justice is the division. One of these is the Tax Division, which
assumes jurisdiction over and handles any case involving a Federal tax
matter as soon as access to the courts is sought by either the United
States or the taxpayer. This is pursuant to authority vested in the
Department of Justice to represent the United States in all court
actions. The Division is headed by an Assistant Attorney General
who has the ultimate responsibility for and control over all the opera
tions of the Division. The first assistant to the Assistant Attorney
General acts in the capacity of an executive officer to the latter, han
dling considerable of the administrative routine of the Division, and
relieving the Assistant Attorney General of some of the burden of case
review. The Administrative Section performs the housekeeping
chores for the Division.
FOUR OPERATING SECTIONS

Within the Tax Division there are four operating sections which
carry out assigned duties as follows:
(a) Trial Section
The Trial Section handles all civil tax litigation to which the
Federal Government is a party, except cases before the Tax Court.
Its activities cover the various Federal district courts and the Court of
Claims in the District of Columbia. Its operations are limited to these
courts of original jurisdiction, since appellate cases become the respon
sibility of the Appellate Section, the activities of which are described
below. The type of case with which the Trial Section finds itself con
cerned most frequently is the suit by a taxpayer against the Govern
ment for refund of tax payments. Suits for collection of taxes, filed by
the Government against the taxpayer, constitute the second largest
group of cases within the jurisdiction of the Trial Section. The balance
involves miscellaneous matters such as representation of the Govern
ment’s interest in bankruptcy petitions, suits for the release of Govern
ment liens for taxes, etc.
The Trial Section is numerically the largest within the Tax Division,
since the attorneys of this Section have a wider area of responsibility
and a larger group of cases to deal with than any of the others. Their
function is to assume full responsibility for the processing of civil cases
and includes the actual argument of the case before the court. For
this purpose the Trial Section attorneys spend a substantial part of
their time in travel status since the bulk of these matters are heard in
Federal district courts all over the country.
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(b) Criminal Section
All criminal tax fraud cases which the Office of Chief Counsel of
the Internal Revenue Service wishes to refer to the United States
attorney for prosecution are first routed to the Criminal Section of
the Tax Division in Washington for clearance. Those cases which
the Criminal Section feels are proper for prosecution are then sent
on to the appropriate United States attorney with instructions to seek
an indictment. The balance are returned to the Office of Chief
Counsel. Unlike the Trial Section, the attorneys in the Criminal
Section of the Tax Division do not, in the normal course of things,
handle the court work themselves. Their primary function is to
screen the cases referred for prosecution by the Office of Chief Counsel,
which task is usually performed within the Washington office. On
rare occasions, however, where the United States attorney requests
help from the Washington office of the Justice Department on a
specific case of a complex nature, one of the staff attorneys of the
Criminal Section will be sent out to the field to assist in the preparation
of the case for trial and, if necessary, in the actual trial.
(c) Appellate Section
The Appellate Section was organized for the specific purpose of han
dling tax cases before the United States courts of appeals. Any tax
case which has been heard in a Federal district court or the United
States Tax Court and in which an appeal is being taken will auto
matically be turned over to the Appellate Section for further handling.
(d) Compromise Section
Under the terms of Executive Order No. 6166, the Department of
Justice has complete jurisdiction over any case in which it conducts
the litigation. This includes the ultimate authority to pass upon offers
in compromise. For the purposes of considering and acting upon such
offers, there is within the Tax Division a group called the Compromise
Section. All compromise offers will be turned over to this Section for
processing regardless of whether the case is in a court of original juris
diction, and thus within the orbit of the Trial Section, or up on appeal
and thus within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Section.

APPENDIX C
INTERAGENCY PROCESSING OF THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF
CASES
taxpayer’s suit for refund

A taxpayer seeking a refund of taxes previously paid must first file
a refund claim with the office of the local district director of internal
revenue. After the claim has been rejected, or if it has not been
acted upon within 6 months, the taxpayer may start a lawsuit
against the district director (or under certain circumstances the
United States) in the United States district court or sue the United
States in the Court of Claims. In either case, the Tax Division of
the Department of Justice has full control of the case as soon as the
complaint is filed. Under present procedure, the Tax Division noti
fies the Chief Counsel’s office by letter that the complaint has been
filed, and requests that the Chief Counsel’s office prepare a “defense
letter.” The defense letter, which is prepared in the Civil Division
of the Chief Counsel’s office, contains a statement of the fact situa
tion involved, the applicable statutes and decisions, and a recom
mended defense position for the Government. Before preparing the
letter, the Civil Division attorney sends for all the files on the case.
No work is done on the case until the files are received. This takes,
on the average. 3 weeks.
After the files are obtained, the attorney studies the case and
drafts a proposed letter, which is reviewed at 2 or, in unusual cases, 3
levels in the Chief Counsel’s office. The final version, produced
about 4 months after the initiation of the case in the Civil Division,
is then sent to the Trial Section of the Tax Division of the Depart
ment of Justice along with the administrative file.
Upon receipt of the defense letter and the file, the Trial Section
attorney makes a new and independent study of the case, on the basis
of which he then prepares the Government’s defense. Rarely does
he rely on the material supplied by the Civil Division without re
peating the legal research. Where he finds it advisable, he communi
cates with the Civil Division attorney who handled the matter to
obtain further information or advice or to request that supplementary
information be obtained. Before trial, the Trial Section attorney
may request, through the Civil Division, that the revenue agent who
initially audited the case in the field be available for conferences at
the place of trial. Only in rare instances will assistance be sought
from the legal staff of the local regional counsel of the Internal Reve
nue Service.
The handling of offers to settle such cases is described in the section
of this appendix on offers in compromise.
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COLLECTION SUITS BY THE GOVERNMENT

Collection suits comprise about 25 percent of the work of the Civil
Division and about 15 percent of that of the Trial Section. A collec
tion suit is instituted for the purpose of assisting in collection of
outstanding tax liabilities, frequently by extending the statute of
limitations. Such suits are usually procedural in nature, the taxpayer
not having disputed the Government’s claim that the tax is due.
Collection suits may also be brought in order to preserve the Govern
ment’s claim in situations where the taxpayer has other creditors, or
has transferred his assets to third parties.
The district director of internal revenue makes the initial recom
mendation that suit be instituted. The file in the case and the district
director’s recommendation are sent either to the office of the Assistant
Commissioner (Operations) in Washington or directly to the Civil
Division of the Office of Chief Counsel. If, in the former event, the
recommendation is approved, the case is sent on to the Civil Division
for further review. If the Civil Division approves, the attorney
handling the case prepares a letter to the Trial Section of the Tax
Division requesting that the suit be instituted, and outlining all the
factual and legal background of the case. These letters are somewhat
similar to the defense letters in refund suit cases. These cases are
reexamined in the Trial Section in much the same manner as refund
cases and, if approved by the Trial Section, are sent out to the United
States attorneys’ offices for initiation of the action.
TAX COURT SUITS

When the Internal Revenue Service proposes additional tax liability
to which the taxpayer does not agree, the Commissioner issues a
statutory notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, which allows him 90
days to appeal to the Tax Court before assessment is made. Thus, he
may have his case reviewed in the Tax Court without having first paid
the alleged deficiency.
Cases placed upon the docket of the Tax Court are processed by
the Appeals Division of the Office of Chief Counsel and are tried by
field representatives of the Chief Counsel, who are known as appellate
counsel.
Upon receipt of the case file from Washington, the appellate
counsel prepares appropriate pleadings, which are filed with the
Tax Court after review in most instances by the Appeals Division
in Washington.
The 16 judges of the Tax Court travel to the various field areas, as
assigned, to hear the dockets of Tax Court cases. Following trial
of the case, the appellate counsel prepares a brief which, like all the
motions and pleadings prepared by him, is reviewed by the Brief
Review Section of the Appeals Division before fifing with the Wash
ington office of the Tax Court.
TAX FRAUD CASES

The United States attorney prosecutes nearly all the criminal
tax-fraud cases for the Government. Such cases, however, must first
be approved for prosecution by both the Office of Chief Counsel of the
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Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Division of the Department of
Justice. Fraud cases begin with a recommendation for criminal
prosecution following investigation by special agents of the Intelli
gence Division of the Internal Revenue Service. Each such recom
mendation is submitted to the regional enforcement counsel for ap
proval. The enforcement counsel makes an exhaustive legal analysis
of the facts and law of the case, and if, in his opinion, the case is up
to prosecution standards, it is referred, through the regional counsel,
to the Criminal Section of the Tax Division. It is accompanied
either by a transmittal letter or by a lengthy criminal reference
report. The short-form letter sets out the facts in the case, con
tains a short statement of the law involved, and requests that criminal
action be initiated. The criminal reference report also is a request
for prosecutive action but offers a very complete statement of the
law and facts in the case, an analysis of the evidence, of the legal
position of the Government, and of the possible defenses by the
proposed defendant. It is used today, in accordance with recently
revised procedures, in all cases except those where, in the discretion
of the regional counsel, emergencies or limitations of time require
immediate action.
In the event that the office of the regional counsel decides against
prosecution, the Intelligence Division may protest this rejection.
The positions of the local Intelligence Division office and of the
enforcement counsel are then communicated formally to the Wash
ington office, where they are reviewed respectively by the Assistant
Commissioner (Operations), under whom the Intelligence Division
operates, and the Enforcement Division of the Office of Chief Counsel,
following which a final decision is made by the Chief Counsel. If the
determination is in favor of prosecution, the case is then sent on to
the Tax Division.
Upon receipt by the Criminal Section of the Tax Division, the case
is assigned to an attorney in the Criminal Section who gives it a
thorough reexamination. His recommendation is reviewed by the
head of the Section. If both favor prosecution, and there is no policy
question involved, the case is sent directly to the United States
attorney for appropriate action. Under any other circumstances, it
must go to the Office of the Assistant Attorney General for final
decision. Where a case is unusually complicated or borderline in
nature, the head of the Criminal Section may assign it to a second
attorney in the Section for study before making a decision.
APPEALS

All appeals in tax cases are handled by the Appellate Section of the
Tax Division, except cases in the United States Supreme Court.
Where the Government has won in the lower court and the taxpayer
files an appeal, the case file is generally turned over to the Appellate
Section of the Tax Division, where the Government’s argument on
appeal is prepared. The Appellate Section attorney to whom the
case is assigned will represent the Government before the Court of
Appeals.
Where the Government has lost in the lower court, it is necessary to
make a decision for or against appeal. The attorney who argued the
case in the court of original jurisdiction prepares a memorandum in
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which he recommends either that an appeal be taken, indicating the
proposed basis therefor, or that the decision of the lower court be
accepted.
The Trial Section attorney will also request the views of the Civil
Division of the Office of Chief Counsel on the advisability of appealing
the case. The Civil Division attorney who was originally assigned to
this case for the purpose of preparing the defense letter or the
request for a collection suit reviews the entire file and such record of
the trial as is available, and prepares a recommendation for or against
appeal. This recommendation is studied by one of the reviewing
staff of the Civil Division and by the head of the Division. The
recommendation is then considered by the Assistant Chief Counsel
(Litigation), whose decision is final. His recommendation is forwarded,
over the signature of the Chief Counsel, to the Tax Division.
The various recommendations are presented to the Chief of the Trial
Section who, after study, transmits the file, after having noted his
concurrence or nonconcurrence, to the Appellate Section. Here the
case goes to one of the reviewers who, after studying the case and
considering the previous memoranda, prepares the Tax Division
recommendation. All of these documents, together with the case
file, are then forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General, who is
vested with ultimate authority to decide all appeal questions. An
attorney in the Solicitor General’s Office is assigned the case for study
and report. The recommendation embodied in this report is subject
to at least one review and, in the event of disagreement, to a third
review by a supervisory official, whereupon it goes to the Solicitor
General for final determination. If the decision of the Solicitor Gen
eral is against appeal, the case is closed. If an appeal is approved, the
file is returned to the Appellate Section where the attorney who was
originally assigned the case proceeds with the assembly of the record,
the preparation of a petition for appeal, and an appellate brief.
Appeals from decisions of the United States Tax Court, although the
Government has been represented in the lower court by the appellate
counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, are also handled by the
Appellate Section of the Tax Division. Where the taxpayer takes an
appeal, the Court of Appeals Section of the Appeals Division of the
Office of Chief Counsel takes charge of the preparation of the record on
appeal, following which the Tax Division assumes control of the case.
Where the Government loses in the Tax Court, the appellate counsel
will prepare an action on decision memorandum similar to that
described above. This memorandum, together with the entire file,
is sent to the Appeals Division in Washington for review. Initial
examination is made by the Brief Review Section attorney who
reviewed the earlier documents in the case. His recommendation,
together with the action on decision memorandum, then goes to
an assistant head of the Division, who reviews the case and makes his
own recommendation. The entire matter then goes to the head of the
Appeals Division. He submits his views to the Assistant Chief
Counsel (Litigation), who makes the final decision as to appeal. If
the decision is to appeal, the Court of Appeals Section of the Appeals
Division prepares a request to that effect which is forwarded to the
Appellate Section of the Tax Division. The procedure in the Tax
Division in such a case is the same as that described above with the
exception that a staff attorney in the Appellate Section examines
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and passes upon the request before it goes to the reviewer for final
determination of the Division recommendation. If the ultimate
decision of the Solicitor General is for appeal of the Tax Court decision,
the Court of Appeals Section of the Appeals Division prepares the
petition for appeal to the proper court and assembles the record. All
further responsibility for the case is lodged in the Appellate Section.
Where an application to the Supreme Court for certiorari is under
consideration, the procedure is approximately the same as that
described above, except that the original action on decision memoran
dum is prepared by the attorney who had charge of the case on appeal
or in the Court of Claims (these go directly to the Supreme Court).
Also, cases which are to be argued before the United States Supreme
Court are normally under the jurisdiction of the Solicitor General.
However, the briefing is usually done by the Tax Division and, at
times, responsibility for arguing such cases is delegated to an Appellate
Section attorney.
OFFERS IN COMPROMISE

Section 3761 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Com
missioner of Internal Revenue, with the consent of the Secretary of the
Treasury, to compromise any tax case. The same statute vests this
authority in the Attorney General in any tax case in which litigation
is pending or under way.
The term “compromise” has a broad area of application and is used
differently by the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Division.
Extensive negotiations are carried on between taxpayers and the
Internal Revenue Service on cases which have not reached the stage
of litigation and which do not concern the ability of the former to pay
an assessed liability. These are not considered by the Internal Rev
enue Service to be “compromise” situations and are not subjected to
the multiple levels of review accorded the cases which are in litigation
or which involve the issue of collectibility. It is with the latter types,
processed under section 3761, that this Section deals.
Offers in compromise of assessed tax liability in cases which have
not reached the litigation stage and which are based on alleged
inability to pay are usually submitted to the district director of
internal revenue in the field. Under a recently revised procedure,
all such offers, where the liability in question is less than $500, may
be finally accepted for the Government by the district director. All
offers may be rejected at that level. Where the liability is $500 or
more, the district director must submit his recommendation for
acceptance to the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in Washington for approval.
Part (b) of section 3761 requires that a legal opinion be prepared
by the General Counsel of the Treasury and be placed on file in the
Office of the Commissioner in all cases where an offer in compromise
is accepted. This function has been delegated to the head of the
Claims Division of the Office of Chief Counsel. Therefore, all cases
involving a liability greater than $500, which have been approved by
the district director in the field and by the Office of the Commissioner,
are sent to the Claims Division for study and for preparation of the
required legal opinion before they can be acted upon.
When an offer in compromise is submitted in any case which is
under consideration by one of the divisions of the Office of Chief
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Counsel, the offer, regardless of amount, together with the recom
mendation of the district director, is forwarded to that organization
for study and preparation of a further recommendation from a legal
viewpoint. The case is then sent to the Office of the Commissioner
for final determination. If the decision of the Commissioner is to
accept the offer, the Claims Division prepares the required legal
opinion.
Offers in compromise of tax cases in litigation (except those in the
Tax Court) are submitted to the Department of Justice and are
reviewed there by the Compromise Section of the Tax Division.
Where such an offer is made, initial consideration is given it by the
attorney who is currently in charge of the case. This will usually be
a Trial Section attorney, but in the instance of a case which is up on
appeal, it will be an attorney of the Appellate Section. Before making
his own recommendation, the Tax Division attorney requests the views
of the Chief Counsel’s Office on the offer. A recent procedural innova
tion by the two agencies makes this step unnecessary in certain cases.
Where a recommendation is sought, the attorney who originally had
charge of the matter for the Office of the Chief Counsel obtains the
views of the local district director of internal revenue, and of any
other interested element of the Service, and then prepares his own
recommendation, which is reviewed in the Chief Counsel’s Office in
the same manner as other such recommendations. The Tax Division
attorney then forwards his own recommendation and that of the Chief
Counsel to his section chief, who adds his own views and transmits the
case to the Compromise Section. There the recommendation will be
reviewed, usually by two other attorneys. In some of the less com
plicated cases, the section head handles the case without a prior staff
recommendation. Pursuant to delegations from the Attorney General
to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division, and
from the latter to the Chief of the Compromise Section, all offers in
which the recommendations by the Office of Chief Counsel and at the
several stages within the Tax Division have been unanimous may be
acted upon finally at the Compromise Section level, except certain
types of cases involving large amounts of money. All such cases or
those which the section head feels should go to the Assistant Attorney
General, and all cases in which there are conflicting recommendations
are sent to the Assistant Attorney General through his first assistant
for further review. Those cases involving large amounts of money,
or which the Assistant Attorney General believes to involve novel
questions of law or policy, are then reviewed by the Attorney General.
All others are disposed of finally by the Office of the Assistant Attorney
General. The decision of the Department of Justice in such cases is
binding upon the Internal Revenue Service.

APPENDIX D
CHRONOLOGY OF SUBCOMMITTEE ACTIVITIES FOR 195a

January 15, 1953.—Subcommittee reconstituted by 83d Congress
with Robert W. Kean of New Jersey as chairman. Other members:
Carl T. Curtis of Nebraska, John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, Thomas E.
Martin of Iowa, Cecil R. King of California, Thomas J. O’Brien of
Illinois, and Hale Boggs of Louisiana.
January 16, 1953.—House Resolution 91 introduced authorizing
Committee on Ways and Means to conduct studies and investigations
of matters within its jurisdiction.
January 16,1953.—House Resolution 92 introduced authorizing the
Committee on Ways and Means and subcommittees thereof to sit
during sessions and recesses of the 83d Congress.
January 23, 1953.—Rules of procedure of the subcommittee in the
82d Congress adopted by the subcommittee for use during the 83d
Congress.
January 29, 1953.—Chairman Kean introduced House Resolu
tion 123 providing funds for the expenses of the investigation and
study authorized by House Resolution 91.
February 3, 1953.—Public hearings begun on the Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax Division. Dwight E. Avis, Head, makes charge of
political interference in operation of that Division and outlines its
operations.
February 4, 1953.—Public hearings begun concerning financial af
fairs of Carroll E. Mealey, former Deputy Commissioner of the
Alcohol Tax Unit.
February 18, 1953.—House Resolution 91 passed.
February 19, 1953.—Abandonment of health policy in criminal tax
fraud cases announced by Attorney General Brownell.
February 20, 1953.—Carl T. Curtis, Nebraska, resigned from sub
committee. Antoni N. Sadlak, Connecticut, appointed in Mr.
Curtis’ place.
February 25, 1953.—Public hearings begun on career of Donald
Tydings and general conditions of Atlanta office of the Alcohol and”
Tobacco Tax Division.
March 4, 1953.—Transcript of testimony given by Donald S.
Tydings in public hearings sent to the Department of Justice with
the recommendation that the Department examine such and ascertain
whether perjury had been committed.
March 5, 1953.—House Resolution 123 passed appropriating
$100,000 for the expenses of the investigation and study authorized
by House Resolution 91.
March 9, 1953.—Study of the operations of and relations between
the Chief Counsel’s Office in the Bureau and the Tax Division in the
Department of Justice begun by the staff.
March 12, 1953.—Public hearings begun concerning the appoint
ment of personnel in the Louisville office of the Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax Division.
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March 17, 1953.—Public hearings begun on the Housatonic Dyeing
& Printing Co.
March 27,1953.—Executive session testimony by Henry W. Grune
wald.
April 6,1953.—Study of reorganization and administrative matters
of Bureau begun by staff.
April 13, 1953.—Public hearings begun with Henry W. Grunewald.
May 25, 1953.—Public hearings held in re ruling of John L. Leban.
May 26, 1953.—Public hearings held on ruling obtained by General
Foods Corp.
May 29,1953.—Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey announced
that effective July 1, 1953, the number of Bureau of Internal Revenue
regions throughout the country would be reduced from 17 to 9.
June 3, 1953.—Grunewald testimony sent to the Department of
Justice for consideration as to possible perjury.
June 3, 1953.—Subcommittee decided to return the Oliphant log
to the attorney in the Department of Justice from whom it was
subpenaed.
June 4, 1953.—Logs of T. J. Lynch, former General Counsel of the
Treasury, and E. H. Foley, Jr., former Under Secretary of the Treas
ury, subpenaed.
July 9, 1953.—Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey announced
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue would thereafter be designated
as the Internal Revenue Service.
August 3, 1953.—Public hearings begun on the extent of the influ
ence of Treasury officials on the decisions in tax matters in the Bureau.
August 5,1953.—Transcript of the hearings on Lasdon case referred
to the Department of Justice and to the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
for such study and action on the matter as might seem appropriate
to each department.
October 5, 1953.—Executive session, consideration of proposed
draft of report.
October 6, 1953.—Executive session hearings with testimony by
Commissioner T. Coleman Andrews and other Internal Revenue
Service officials.
October 7, 1953.—Executive session hearings with testimony by
Attorney General Herbert Brownell and other Justice Department
officials.
October 8, 1953.—Executive session hearings with testimony by
Under Secretary of the Treasury Marion B. Folsom.
October 30, 1953.—Subcommittee’s report completed.

APPENDIX E
On July 1, 1953, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue established
standard nomenclature for organizational units and principal officers
of the Internal Revenue Service. This directive was a result of a
study undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service to eliminate the
confusion which resulted from the frequent changes in nomenclature
during implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952.
The geographic divisions and subdivisions of the Internal Revenue
Service were redesignated as regions and districts. New names were
given to units of operation at national, regional, and divisional levels.
The titles of some of the principal officers of the Internal Revenue
Service were also changed.
The names of the major units and the titles of the corresponding
officers now are as follows:
Internal Revenue Service—Commissioner
National office—Assistant Commissioner
Regional office—Regional Commissioner
District office—District Director
Division (national)—Director
Division (region or district)—Chief
Branch—Chief
Section—Chief
Unit—Supervisor
Group—Supervisor
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